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The California Supreme Court Survey
A Review of Decisions:
December 1980 - February 1981
In a continuing effort to provide the legal community with an analysis of
precedential California Supreme Court cases, the Pepperdine Law Review
surveys the following decisions. It is hoped that this issue's discussion will
provide a useful source of material for the legal practitioner.
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. DUE PROCESS
1. Commitment under California Welfare and Institutions
Code Section 4825: In re Hop
California Welfare and Institutions Code section 48251 permits a
parent or a conservator of a developmentally disabled person2 to
commit such person to either a state hospital or a private institu-
tion by mere application. In In re Hop,3 the California Supreme
Court held that absent either a pre-admission hearing or a know-
ing and intelligent request by the person being admitted, section
4825 is constitutionally infirm on both due process and equal pro-
tection grounds.4
In applying a compelling state interest test 5 to the commitment
statute, the court in Hop determined that section 4825 could not
stand constitutional due process scrutiny.6 The court reasoned
that since admission into an institution based on section 4825
1. The statute provides, in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 6000, the admission of an
adult developmentally disabled person to a state hospital or private insti-
tution shall be upon the application of the person's parent or conservator
in accordance with the provisions of section 4653 and 4803. Any person so
admitted to a state hospital may leave the state hospital at any time, if
such parent or conservator gives notice of his or her desire for the depar-
ture of the developmentally disabled person to any member of the hospi-
tal staff and completes normal hospitalization departure procedures.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4825 (West Supp. 1981).
2. (a) "Developmental disability" means a disability which originates
before an individual attains age 18, continues, or can be expected to con-
tinue indefinitely, and constitutes a substantial handicap for such individ-
ual. As defined by the Director of Developmental Services, in consultation
with the Superintendent of Public Instruction, this term shall include
mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, and autism. This term shall
also include handicapping conditions found to be closely related to mental
retardation or to require treatment similar to that required for mentally
retarded individuals, but shall not include other handicapping conditions
that are solely physical in nature.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4512 (West Supp. 1981).
3. 29 Cal. 3d 82, 623 P.2d 282, 171 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1981). On a petition for
habeas corpus brought by a public defender, Irene Hop, a developmentally dis-
abled woman, sought to be removed from Lanterman State Hospital, where she
had been relocated to by her mother in 1979, at a time when she lacked the ability
to protest such a transfer. Justice Richardson delivered the opinion for the unani-
mous court.
4. Id. at 86, 623 P.2d at 285, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
5. The court used the compelling state interest test because Hop's personal
liberty, fundamental in nature, was at stake. See In re Moye, 22 Cal. 3d 457, 584
P.2d 1097, 149 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1978) (applied strict scrutiny in evaluating a commit-
ment procedure); People v. Olivas, 17 Cal. 3d 236, 551 P.2d 375, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55
(1976) (applied strict scrutiny in reviewing youthful offender statute which al-
lowed commitment beyond the normal sentence for a given crime).
6. 29 Cal. 3d at 92, 623 P.2d at 288, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
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could not be subject to a waiver by acquiescence,7 it was not vol-
untary and therefore required a judicial hearing.8 In applying a
rational basis standard under equal protection analysis, the court
found section 4825 unconstitutional.9 The Hop court stated that
"[n o other class of adults similarly situated and in need of pro-
tective custody may lawfully be placed in a state hospital without
a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights, or a request, or a judi-
cial determination that placement is appropriate."'10
Thus, the California Supreme Court has limited section 4825
commitments to state hospitals or private institutions to those
particularized situations where a developmentally disabled per-
son'" either knowingly and intelligently requests admission or is
given a pre-admission hearing.
B. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
1. Excessive Pretrial Publicity as it Affects the Right to a
Fair Trial: People v. Harris
The possibility that potentially prejudicial pretrial publicity
might require a change of venue from the area where the crime
had been committed depends on whether a reasonable likelihood
exists that a defendant could not get a fair trial in that area.' It is
well established in California that in more populous and hetero-
geneous communities pretrial publicity weighs less against grant-
ing a change of venue.2 The California Supreme Court in People
7. The idea that a developmentally disabled person did not, and quite possi-
bly could not, object to his or her placement into a hospital or other facility he or
she waived any right to object to the constitutionality of such placement was dis-
credited by the Hop court.
8. The Hop court held that a constitutional waiver must be both voluntary
and intelligent, assuring that the person is not only aware of his or her rights, but
also aware of the consequences of his action. Id. at 91, 623 P.2d at 287, 171 Cal.
Rptr. at 726 (quoting In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 938 n.10, 569 P.2d 1286, 1296 n.10,
141 Cal. Rptr. 298, 308 n.10 (1977)). See generally Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806
(1975).
9. 29 Cal. 3d at 92-93, 623 P.2d at 288-89, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 727-28.
10. Id. at 92, 623 P.2d at 288, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
11. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
1. See Maine v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 375, 438 P.2d 372, 66 Cal. Rptr. 724
(1968) where the California Supreme Court held that a change of venue should be
granted if potentially prejudicial pretrial publicity creates a situation where a de-
fendant is likely not to get a fair trial in that area.
2. See People v. Sommerholder, 9 Cal. 3d 290, 508 P.2d 289, 107 Cal. Rptr. 289
(1973); People v. Manson, 61 Cal. App. 3d 102, 132 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1974); Corona v.
Superior Court, 24 Cal. App. 3d 872, 101 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1972). These cases all held
1115
v. Harris3 applied this general rule to a situation where extensive
pretrial publicity, concentrated in the area of the crimes, was
found to be sufficiently dissipated so as not to require a change of
venue.
4
In applying the test for change of venue,5 the court found that
where other factors are relatively equal, the size of the commu-
nity would determine the venue issue.6 Looking at the commu-
nity in which the trial had taken place,7 the court in Harris
reasoned that because the community of San Diego was so large
and cosmopolitan, the prejudicial effect of pretrial publicity was
minimized.8
Even though the court found the pretrial publicity to be both
damaging in nature and extensive in scope,9 the court in Harris
held that a change of venue would not be required for the defend-
ant to have a fair trial.O While in similar cases such as People v.
Manson" and People v. Corona,12 prejudicial pretrial publicity
that a change of venue is not necessary where trials take place in large, metropoli-
tan areas.
3. 28 Cal. 3d 935, 623 P.2d 240, 171 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1981). In his San Diego trial
for committing various felonies including two counts of murder, Robert Harris was
convicted of several felonies, the gravest, first degree murder with special, circum-
stnces, carries the penalty of death. Before his trial, newspapers and television
carried numerous stories most of which were very damaging to his case. Harris
appealed many aspects of his conviction but none of the court's discussions are as
important as its discussion of pretrial publicity. Justice Clark wrote the majority
opinion, with Justices Richardson and Newman concurring. In a separate opinion,
Justice Tobriner also concurred in the judgment, but expressed his belief that the
death penalty was unconstitutional. Chief Justice Bird filed a dissenting opinion
arguing that Harris could not have received a fair trial in San Diego with all of the
local media attention.
4. Id. at 949, 623 P.2d at 247-48, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 685-86.
5. The court in Harris held that "(t)he factors to be considered are the na-
ture and gravity of the offense, the nature and extent of the news coverage, the
size of the community, the status of the defendant in the community, and the pop-
ularity and prominence of the victim." Id. at 948, 623 P.2d at 247, 171 Cal.,Rptr. at
685 (citing People v. Salas, 7 Cal. 3d 812, 818, 500 P.2d 7, 11, 103 Cal. Rptr. 431, 435
(1972)).
6. 28 Cal. 3d at 948-49, 623 P.2d at 247, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
7. The court pointed out that San Diego County is the third most populous in
the state and that the city of San Diego is the second largest in California.
8. 28 Cal. 3d at 949, 623 P.2d at 248, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 686.
9. The Harris court stated that "(p)ress coverage of the crimes was extensive
and included such information as that defendant was on parole for manslaughter,
that his brother had confessed and had placed the blame primarily on defendant,
and that defendant himself had confessed." Id. at 948, 623 P.2d at 247, 171 Cal.
Rptr. at 685.
10. The court based this finding solely on the fact that "the populous metro-
politan character of the community dissipate(s) the impact of pretrial publicity."
Id. at 949, 623 P.2d at 248, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 686.
11. 61 Cal. App. 3d 102, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1976) (news coverage of the events
was widely disseminated throughout the state of California and was not concen-
trated in the Los Angeles area).
12. 24 Cal. App. 3d 872, 101 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1972) (news reports extended
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covered the entire state, decreasing any positive effect which a
change of venue may have, in People v. Harris the pretrial public-
ity was concentrated in the San Diego County area. 13 The Harris
decision established that even where there is a great possibility
that a defendant may get a fair trial with a change of venue, the
change of venue will not be required if the trial takes place in a
large community such as San Diego. Consequently, defendants
will have greater problems attempting to get a change of venue if
their trial is in a populous area.
2. Right to Plead Guilty Without the Consent of Counsel:
People v. Chadd
California Penal Code Section 1018, as amended in 1973, provides that a
defendant charged with a crime for which the penalty is either death or life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole could not plead guilty to
such an offense without both presence and consent of counsel. In People v.
Chadd, the California Supreme Court interpretted section 1018 asforeclos-
ing the possibility of such a defendant waiving counsel, proceeding pro se,
and entering a guilty plea.
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 1018 of the California Penal Code offers extraordinary
protection to a criminal defendant charged with "a felony for
which the maximum penalty is death or life imprisonment with-
out the possibility of parole."' It provides that a defendant may
not plead guilty to such a offense without the presence and con-
sent of counsel. 2 Recently, the California Supreme Court in Peo-
throughout the state of California and were not limited to the county in which the
trial had taken place).
13. Chief Justice Bird's dissenting opinion discusses at length the extent of
the news coverage in the San Diego area. Id. at 965-976, 623 P.2d at 256-68, 171 Cal.
Rptr. at 695-702.
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1018 (West Supp. 1980).
2. Section 1018 provides:
Unless otherwise provided by law every plea must be entered or with-
drawn by the defendant himself in open court. No plea of guilty of a fel-
ony for which the maximum punishment is death, or life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole, shall be received from a defendant who
does not appear with counsel, nor shall any such plea be received without
the consent of the defendant's counsel. * * * No plea of guilty of a felony
for which the maximum punishment is not death or life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole shall be accepted from any defendant
who does not appear with counsel unless the court shall first fully inform
him of his right to counsel and unless the court shall find that the defend-
ant understands his right to counsel and freely waives it and then, only if
1117
ple v. Chadd,3 upheld the validity of section 1018 while at the
same time, cltarifying its meaning. The majority opinion, written
by Justice Mosk, firmly established that only one possible con-
struction of section 1018 could be supported. The very plain and
straightforward language of section 1018 states that in certain
cases, 4 a guilty plea cannot be accepted by a court unless the de-
fendant is represented by counsel, who is present at the time the
plea is entered, and provided counsel consents to such a plea.5
In Chadd, the defendant, Billy Lee Chadd, was arraigned on ten
separate felony counts, 6 including one count of first-degree mur-
der7 with special circumstances8 which carries the penalty of
death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole. 9
Through appointed counsel, David R. Pitkin, the defendant origi-
nally pleaded not guilty to all charges.10 One week later at the
bail hearing, Mr. Pitkin appeared alone and explained that Chadd
had attempted to commit suicide." Upon Chadd's return to the
the defendant has expressly stated in open court, to the court, that he
does not wish to be represented by counsel. On application of the defend-
ant at any time before judgment the court may, and in case of a defendant
who appeared without counsel at the time of the plea the court must, for a
good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of
not guilty substituted.
Upon indictment or information against a corporation a plea of guilty
may be put in by counsel.
This section shall be liberally construed to effect these objects and to
promote justice.
Id. (emphasis added).
3. 28 Cal. 3d 739, 621 P.2d 837, 170 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1981).
4. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
5. See note 2 supra.
6. Defendant Chadd was charged with the following crimes: count one, Mur-
der of Patricia Franklin; count two, Rape of Patricia Franklin; count three, Sodomy
of Patricia Franklin; count four, Robbery of Patricia Franklin; count five, Burglary
of Patricia Franklin's house; count six, Murder of Linda Hewitt; count seven, Rape
of Linda Hewitt; count eight, Sodomy of Linda Hewitt; count nine, Oral copulation
of Linda Hewitt; and count ten, Robbery of Linda Hewitt.
28 Cal. 3d at 744 n.1, 621 P.2d at 839 n.1, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 800 n.l.
7. Count six of the information, the murder of Linda Hewitt, received the ma-
jor emphasis in the court's opinion.
8. The existence of "special circumstances" limits the type of cases in which
the death penalty of life imprisonment without possibility of parole may be
sought. Among the circumstances included are murder for hire, murder with un-
necessary torture, murder of a police officer, and murder while in the perpetration
of certain acts, including rape, robbery, sodomy, oral copulation, and burglary.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 190.2 (West Supp. 1980). Chadd had been charged with rape,
sodomy, oral copulation and robbery in connection with the murder of Linda Hew-
itt. See note 6 supra.
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West Supp. 1980).
10. "Because it appeared to the court that the defendant might be mentally in-
competent, after a suicide attempt the court directed that he undergo a 72-hour pe-
riod of treatment and evaluation in a psychiatric facility. 28 Cal. 3d at 744, 621 P.2d
at 839, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
11. Id. at 745, 621 P.2d at 840, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
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court, the prosecution announced its intention to seek the death
penalty for the count of first-degree murder.12 After a brief collo-
quy between the defendant and the court, in which Chadd ex-
pressed his desire either to receive the death penalty or to
commit suicide, the court ordered Chadd to submit to a psychiat-
ric examination.' 3 After being found mentally competent, Chadd
inisted on pleading guilty, despite his counsel's objections.' 4
Notwithstanding the prosecutor's recommendation that such a
plea should not be accepted, the court found the defendant com-
petent enough to represent himself under the standards estab-
lished by Faretta v. California,'5 and accepted his guilty plea over
Mr. Pitkin's refusal to give consent.16 A jury, empanelled to set
punishment, imposed the death penalty17 from which an appeal
was automatically taken.' 8
On appeal, Chadd "contend[ed] that the trial court had no au-
thority to accept his guilty plea to a capital offense in the face of
his counsel's express refusal to the entry of such a plea."'19 A ma-
jority of the court20 fully agreed.2 1 Recognizing that Mr. Pitkin
was never officially discharged as defense counsel of record, Jus-
12. Alleging "special circumstances," the prosecutor sought the death penalty
for the murder of Linda Hewitt, count six of the information. Id. at 744, 621 P.2d at
839, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
13. Id. at 745, 621 P.2d at 840, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
14. Even though counsel "acknowledged that defendant was attempting to
enter such a plea, he stated 'I want the record to reflect that it's without my con-
sent.'" Id.
15. 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (the United States Supreme Court held that the sixth
amendment through the fourteenth amendment, guarantees a constitutionally
based right to self-representation if undertaken by the defendant both voluntarily
and intelligently).
16. 28 Cal. 3d at 745, 601 P.2d at 840, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
17. Id. at 746, 621 P.2d at 840, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
18. "When upon any plea a judgment of death is rendered, an appeal is auto-
matically taken by the defendant without any action by him or his counsel." CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1239(b) (West Supp. 1980).
19. 28 Cal. 3d at 746, 621 P.2d at 840, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
20. Justices Mosk, Tobriner, and Newman were in the majority, with Chief
Justice Bird concurring in the judgment. Justice Richardson wrote a concurring
and dissenting opinion joined by Justice Clark.
21. Penal Code Section 1018 provides in relevant part that no guilty plea to a
felony punishable by death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole
'shall be received from a defendant who does not appear with counsel, or shall any
such plea be received without the consent of the defendant's counsel.' The record
amply demonstrates that Mr. Pitkin did not give that consent. Under the terms of
section 1018, therefore, the court erred in allowing defendant to plead guilty to
count 6 of the information. 28 Cal. 3d at 746,621 P.2d at 840, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 801
(quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 1018 (West Supp. 1980)).
1119
tice Mosk dutifully avoided a confrontation between the constitu-
tional right to self-representation established in Faretta and the
legislature's power to regulate or conditionally limit a defendant's
right to plead guilty in capital cases or those involving life
sentences.
2 2
The first major issue addressed by the court concerned whether
or not there was sufficient state interest in the criminal justice
system to warrant a denial of a defendant's right to plead guilty to
a capital offense without the consent of counsel. The second ma-
jor issue centered on whether or not the scope of self-representa-
tion should extend to include the right to plead guilty to a capital
offense.
II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
Justice Mosk placed a great deal of importance on the statutory
evolution of penal code section 1018.23 Enacted in 1872, section
1018 remained virtually unchanged until it was amended in 1949.24
Basically, the 1949 amendment provided that in felony cases
where the punishment to be imposed was death or life imprison-
ment without possibility of parole, a guilty plea from a defendant
appearing without counsel would not be accepted. In other felony
cases, a guilty plea would not be accepted from a defendant ap-
pearing without counsel unless the defendant had first been in-
formed of his right to counsel and, after being so informed, had
freely waived such right.25 A further amendment in 1951 added
the words "and then only if the defendant has expressly stated in
open court, to the court, that he does not wish to be represented
by counsel"2 6 in order to give greater protection to the defendant
22. According to Justice Mosk, since counsel for the defendant was never for-
mally discharged from his duties, deciding whether or not a capital defendant may
discharge his counsel in order to plead guilty would be an adjudication of a hypo-
thetical question, i.e., the rendition of an advisory opinion, which the court had no
power to do. See Younger v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 102, 577 P.2d 1014, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 674 (1978).
23. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
24. 1949 Cal. Stats. 2298 (current version at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1018 (West
Supp. 1980)).
25. The amendment states, in pertinent part:
No plea of guilty for a felony for which the maximum punishment is
death, or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, shall be re-
ceived from a defendant who does not appear with counsel, nor shall any
plea of guilty of any other felony be accepted from any defendant who
does not appear with counsel unless the court shall first fully inform him
of his right to counsel and unless the court shall find that the defendant
understands his right to counsel and freely waives it.
Id.
26. 1951 Cal. Stats. 245 (current version at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1018 (West
Supp. 1980).
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in a noncapital felony case. A 1973 amendment 27 appears to have
completed the statutory evolution of section 1018. The importance
of this amendment is that it added the requirement that counsel
consent to a guilty plea in a capital case.28
The first in a line of cases dealing with the interpretation of sec-
tion 1018, as it pertains to Chadd, is People v. Ballentine.29 Al-
though Ballentine was decided well before the 1973 amendment
requiring the consent of counsel, the holding in that case is rele-
vant to the discussion in Chadd. Like the defendant in Chadd,
Ballentine had been represented by counsel at his arraignment.3 0
Unlike the circumstances in Chadd, however, Ballentine's attor-
ney was allowed to withdraw and Ballentine expressly waived his
right to counsel, wishing instead to plead guilty to murder.31 The
guilty plea was accepted, but the supreme court reversed the
judgment.3 2 The Ballentine court held that section 1018, as it then
existed, "[did] not prevent a defendant from waiving his right to
the aid of counsel and defending himself. It merely prohibit[ed]
the court from receiving a plea of guilty to a felony for which the
maximum punishment [was] death [when such plea was] made
by a defendant not represented by counsel."33
27. The only difference between the 1973 amendment and the statute in its
present form is a minor substitution of words and a deletion of a sentence dealing
with murders perpetrated by minors which, in effect, makes the two substantially
the same.
28. Prior to 1973, the law required only that a capital defendant have counsel;
the consent of counsel to a plea of guilty was not required. See, e.g., People v.
Vaughn, 9 Cal. 3d 321, 508 P.2d 318, 107 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1973). Applying section 1018
before the 1973 amendment, the court held that although representation by coun-
sel in a capital case was required, counsel need not consent to a guilty plea if the
defendant was not guilty. At least one case decided after 1973 held likewise. See
People v. Teron, 23 Cal. 3d 103, 588 P.2d 773, 151 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1979). Determining
the 1973 amendment, did not apply retroactively and following Vaughn, the court
held that a defendant had a right to plead guilty to a capital offense even if coun-
sel refused to give his consent.
29. 39 Cal. 2d 193, 246 P.2d 35 (1952) (the judgment was reversed in favor of the
defendant because his guilty plea to murder and robbery was accepted while the
defendant was without counsel, contrary to penal code section 1018, as it then ex-
isted).
30. Id. at 194, 246 P.2d at 36.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 197, 246 P.2d at 37.
33. Id. at 195-96, 246 P.2d at 36. The court further noted:
Although a defendant has the right to defend himself in person in a
criminal prosecution (Const., art. I, § 13), he is not guaranteed the right to
plead guilty to a charge of a felony punishable by death. In that situation
'such proceedings shall be had as are ... prescribed by law.' (Const., art.
I, § 8.) The legislature has deprived the court of the power to accept a
1121
The court reasoned:
Not having an absolute right to enter a plea of guilty, the defendant is not
deprived of any right by being permitted to enter a plea only if he is repre-
sented by counsel. The validity of the limitation upon entry of the plea is
not affected, therefore, by the provision of one statute permitting the plea
when the defendant has representation. 3 4
The Chadd court might have simply cited Ballentine as author-
ity for holding that a defendant charged with a capital offense has
no right to plead guilty without counsel and ended the discussion
there. Instead, the court chose to consider and distinguish two
other important cases.
In People v. Vaughn,35 Justice Tobriner, writing for the major-
ity, found that acceptance by the court of a guilty plea from a de-
fendant charged with a capital offense, and who was not
represented by counsel, was not error.36 Unfortunately, Vaughn
was decided five and one half months prior to the passage of the
1973 amendment adding the consent of counsel requirement to
section 1018.37 Therefore, the language in Vaughn construing sec-
tion 1018 could not be considered, in any sense, as binding prece-
dent.
Another important case discussed by the Chadd court was Peo-
ple v. Teron 38 which, surprisingly, followed the decision in
Vaughn. In dictum, the Teron court held that a defendant had
"the right to plead guilty, even against the advice of counsel."39
The majority in Chadd, properly disapproved of Teron since that
case, likewise, "did not take into account this legislative develop-
ment after Vaughn."4o Believing that "the legislature [had]"
closed the statutory gap revealed in Vaughn,41" the Chadd court
asserted "that since the 1973 amendment a capital defendant
[was] no longer permitted to plead guilty. . . against the advice
of his attorney."42
Turning to the issue of self-representation, Justice Mosk dis-
cussed the importance of Faretta v. California4Q to the Chadd de-
cision. In Faretta, the United States Supreme Court recognized a
guilty plea from a defendant charged with a felony punishable with death
when he is not represented by counsel.
Id. at 196, 246 P.2d at 37.
34. Id. at 196-97, 246 P.2d at 37.
35. 9 Cal. 3d 321, 508 P.2d 318, 107 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1973). See note 28 supra.
36. 9 Cal. 3d at 328, 508 P.2d at 322, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
37. Vaughn was decided on April 10, 1973. The 1973 amendment was signed
and fied on September 24, 1973.
38. 23 Cal. 3d 103, 588 P.2d 773, 151 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1979). See note 28 supra.
39. 23 Cal. 3d at 115, 588 P.2d at 779, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
40. 28 Cal. 3d at 750 n.7, 621 P.2d at 843 n.7, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 804 n.7.
41. Id. at 749, 621 P.2d at 843, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
42. Id. at 750, 621 P.2d at 843, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
43. See note 15 supra.
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constitutional right of self-representation in state criminal ac-
tions 4 implicitly contained within the Sixth Amendment. 45 How-
ever, the Court recognized that this right was not to be absolute.
At a minimum, the defendant had to both choose to represent
himself and to conduct his defense in an intelligent and compe-
tent manner.46 The state retained sufficient interest in the ade-
quacy of the defense to place limits on this right.47
In determining the scope of a defendant's right to self-represen-
tation, the Chadd court found that "from a defendant's conceded
right to 'make a defense' in 'an adversary criminal trial,'" it may
not be intended that a defendant has a "right to make no such de-
fense and to have no such trial, even when his life is at stake."4 8
Further the court stated:
Nothing in Faretta, either expressly or impliedly, deprives the state of the
right to conclude that the danger of erroneously imposing a death sen-
tence outweighs the minor infringement of the right of self-representation
resulting when defendant's right to plea guilty in capital cases is subject
to the requirement of his counsel's consent.
4 9
The majority noted that a state could refuse to accept guilty pleas
altogether, instead of just conditioning such pleas on consent of
counsel.5 0
According to the court, an apt analogy could be drawn between
44. 422 U.S. at 812-34.
45. "Although not stated in the Amendment in so many words, the right to
self-representation-to make one's own defense personally-is thus necessarily
implied by the structure of the Amendment." Id. at 819 (footnote omitted).
46. Id. at 835.
47. For example, "[a] State may-even over objection by the accused-ap-
point a 'standby counsel' to aid the accused if and when the accused requests
help, and to be available to represent the accused in the event that termination of
the defendant's self-representation is necessary." Id. at 835 n.46.
48. 28 Cal. 3d at 751, 621 P.2d at 844, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
49. Id.
Even in noncapital cases the state has properly circumscribed the right
to plead guilty in order to protect defendants against the consequences of
their own folly or neglect. Thus even an undoubtedly intelligent and vol-
untary guilty plea made by a defendant represented by counsel cannot be
accepted until the court has satisfied itself by an evidentiary hearing that
'there is a facutal basis for such a plea'.
Id. at 751 n.8, 621 P.2d at 844 n.8, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 805 n.8 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1192.5 (West Supp. 1980)).
50. 28 Cal. 3d at 751, 621 P.2d at 844, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 805. See, e.g., North Caro-
lina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 n.38-39 (1970). The Supreme Court upheld defendant's
plea of guilty to second-degree murder stating that although a state may decide
not to accept plea bargains, but instead attempt to prove a first-degree murder
case, the state is not required to do so, and may accept the plea of guilty to the
lesser charge.
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a waiver of counsel in order to plead guilty and a waiver of an au-
tomatic appeal.51 Although the idea of waiver of automatic appeal
predates Faretta, "nothing in Faretta abrogates that rule."5 2 In
fact, in Massie v. Sumner,53 the Court of Appeals for the ninth cir-
cuit recently held that a compulsory review of a California death
sentence did not violate the defendant's right to self-representa-
tion as set forth in Faretta.54 This holding relates back to the idea
that the state has a significant interest in the fair administration
of criminal justice, especially when a death sentence is involved.55
Justice Mosk reasoned that the state's interest is no less pro-
nounced when, as in Chadd a defendant is permitted to plead
guilty to a capital offense over the objections of counsel.56 Fur-
ther, he held that "the requirement of counsel's consent to such a
plea was one of the 'reasonable proceedings' held permissible by
the Massie court for the purpose of protecting that interest."57
III. THE DISSENT
In a dissenting opinion,58 Justice Richardson strongly disagreed
with the majority's handling of the right to self-representation is-
sue. It was fundamental to Justice Richardson that a defendant's
right to self-representation not be disturbed. Citing Faretta, the
dissenting justice argued that the right to refrain from offering a
51. It is manifest that the state in its solicitude for a defendant under sen-
tence of death has not only invoked on his behalf a right to review the
conviction by means of an automatic appeal but has also imposed a duty
upon this court to make such a review. We cannot avoid or abdicate this
duty merely because defendant desires to waive the right provided for
him. In other contexts it has been held that a defendant's waiver or at-
tempted waiver of a right is ineffective where it would involve also the
renuniciation of a correlative duty imposed upon the court.
28 Cal. 3d at 752, 621 P.2d at 844, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 805 (quoting People v. Stanworth,
71 Cal. 2d 820, 833, 457 P.2d 889, 898, 80 Cal. Rptr. 49, 58 (1969)).
52. 28 Cal. 3d at 752, 621 P.2d at 844, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 805. See, e.g., People v.
Teron, 23 Cal. 3d 103, 588 P.2d 733, 151 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1979). The California
Supreme Court, after Faretta, reasserted the holding in Stanworth that an auto-
matic appeal may not be waived.
53. 624 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.LW. 3494 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1981)
(on a writ of habeas corpus, defendant was denied a waiver of his automatic ap-
peal of a death sentence by comparing the waiver to the right of self-representa-
tion).
54. Id. at 73-74.
55. Id. at 74.
56. 28 Cal. 3d at 753, 621 P.2d at 845, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
57. Id.
58. 28 Cal. 3d at 759, 621 P.2d at 848, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 809. The opinion was both
concurring and dissenting, but the concurring aspect was separate and apart from
the main issues in the case. These collateral matters concerned counts two, three,
four, and five of the original indictment which the majority found to be barred by
the statute of limitations.
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defense was also a personal right.59 "If the right to 'take the stand
and confess guilt' is constitutionally protected by Faretta from
state interference, then surely the comparable right to appear at
the arraignment and plead guilty is likewise so protected."60
The dissent cited People v. Teron,6 1 disapproved of by the ma-
jority,62 for the proposition that a defendant does have the right to
plead guilty despite contrary advice from counsel. The dissent
continued by referring to national acceptance of such a right.63 In
support of this position, Justice Richardson pointed to various
factors which motivate a plea of guilty which justify allowing a
capital defendant the opportunity to plead guilty even without
counsel's consent: the desire to clear one's conscience; the desire
to gain a tactical advantage; the desire to avoid a prolonged trial;
and the desire to prevent unnecessary embarrasment.6 4 The pri-
mary thrust of the dissenting opinion was that "the state can as-
sert no interest sufficiently compelling to override defendant's
constitutionally protected freedom of choice in the matter of his
own plea, so long as that plea is voluntarily and knowingly made,
and has sufficient factual basis."65
IV. ANALYSIS AND IMPACT
Although the Chadd court briefly discussed the construction of
section 1018 of the California Penal Code,66 the opinion focused
59. 28 Cal. 3d at 760, 621 P.2d at 849, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 810 (Richardson, J., dis-
senting).
60. Id.
61. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
62. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
63. 28 Cal. 3d at 760, 621 P.2d at 849, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 810 (Richardson, J., dis-
senting).
64. Id. at 761, 621 P.2d at 850, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 811 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
Further the dissent states:
If he chooses to do so, intelligently and voluntarily, the defendant
should have the right to accomlish these ends by pleading guilty. Under
the majority's holding, however, state-appointed counsel can defeat these
purposes with impunity by simply declining to consent to the plea. To me
it makes no sense to say that a criminal defendant has a constitutional
right to take the stand during his trial and freely admit his guilt but if the
defendant wishes to spare himself the ordeal and embarrassment of trial
by pleading guilty before trial his lawyer can prevent his doing so, and
this even though he cannot be compelled to accept a lawyer.
Id.
65. 28 Cal. 3d at 762, 621 P.2d at 850, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 811 (Richardson, J., dis-
senting).
66. The court states that:
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primarily on the fact that the interest of the defendant to make a
plea competes with that of the state in the fair administration of
criminal justice.
A defendant's personal interest in making his own plea was es-
tablished early in the development of California law.6 7 It was re-
quired that the defendant personally and in open court, enter his
own plea. The purpose of this requirement was to ensure that the
plea was his own.68 Recently, California courts have reiterated
this position. 69
The right to enter a guilty plea developed later, initially emerg-
ing from a belief that a defendant should be the master of his own
destiny.7 0 More recently, a defendant's right to plead guilty has
been allowed on a case by case basis.7 ' The right itself now
seems to have met its demise with the Chadd decision. The
Chadd court stated that the concept of an absolute right to plead
guilty,72 in certain cases, did not exist in California. 73
Closely associated with a defendant's right to enter his own
[Ilt is difficult to conceive a plainer statement of law than the rule of
section 1018 that no guilty plea to a capital offense shall be received 'with-
out the consent of the defendant's counsel.' It is settled that 'when statu-
tory language is thus clear and unambiguous there is no need for
construction, and courts should not indulge in it.'
Id. at 746, 621 P.2d at 841, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 802 (quoting Solberg v. Superior Court,
19 Cal. 3d 182, 198, 561 P.2d 1148, 1158, 137 Cal. Rptr. 460, 470 (1977)). See also Cami-
netti v. Pac. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 2d 344, 138 P.2d 908 (1943); First Congrega-
tional Church v. County of Los Angeles, 9 Cal. 2d 591, 71 P.2d 1106 (1937); Rile v.
Robbins, 1 Cal. 2d 285, 34 P.2d 715 (1934); People v. Stanley, 193 Cal. 428, 225 P. 1
(1924).
67. A plea confessing himself to be guilty of crime should not be entered
except with the express consent of the defendant, given by him person-
ally, in direct terms, in open court. Nothing should be left to implication,
and his confession of guilt should be explicitly made by himself in person
in the presence of the court.
People v. McCrory, 41 Cal. 458, 461 (1871).
68. In re Martinez, 52 Cal. 2d 808, 815, 345 P.2d 449, 453 (1959).
69. People v. Berry, 257 Cal. App. 2d 731, 65 Cal. Rptr. 125 (1968) (guilty plea
must be given by the defendant personally in open court); People v. Martin, 230
Cal. App. 2d 62, 40 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1964) (a personal plea need not come from the
mouth of the defendant, it must evidence either authorization or adoption if spo-
ken by defense counsel).
70. In re Rose, 62 Cal. 2d 384, 398 P.2d 428, 42 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1955) (client and
not the attorney has the burden to decide whether or not he should plead guilty).
71. See People v. Vaughn, 9 Cal. 3d 321, 508 P.2d 318, 107 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1973);
In re Beaty, 64 Cal. 2d 760, 414 P.2d 817, 51 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1966).
72. The Chadd court disaffirmed as much of the decision in People v. Teron, 23
Cal. 3d 103, 588 P.2d 773, 151 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1979), as held "that a capital defendant
'has the right to plead guilty, even against the advice of counsel.'" 28 Cal. 3d at 750
n.7, 621 P.2d at 843 n.7, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 804 n.7. In effect, the court in Chadd stated
that in capital cases a defendant had no absolute right to plead guilty.
73. This holding was restricted in that only those defendants who were sub-
ject to the death penalty or life imprisonment without possibility of parole were
denied such an absolute right.
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plea is the right of the defendant to offer his own defense. Even
before Faretta v. California,74 a pro se 75 defense was widely ac-
cepted.76 The Faretta decision merely recognized its existence
while at the same time explaining and limiting its use.77 The
Supreme Court in Faretta explained that the right to offer a de-
fense is personal to the accused.78 Further, the Court reasoned
that "[tihe language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contem-
plate[d] that counsel, like the other defense tools guaranteed by
the Amendment should be an aid to a willing defendant-not an
organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant
and his right to defend himself personally."7 9 Otherwise counsel
would not be an assistant, but would be a master and the right to
offer a defense would be stripped of the personal character which
rests upon the sixth amendment.8 0 Hence, the defense itself
would not be personal.8 1
At issue in Chadd was that portion of the Faretta decision
guaranteeing a defendant the right to offer his own defense. The
Chadd court carefully explained that although Faretta guaran-
teed the accused a right to offer a defense, it did not necessarily
follow that Faretta also guaranteed the accused a right to choose
to forgo offering a defense by pleading guilty.82 A state may re-
74. See note 15 supra.
75. "For himself; in his own behalf; in person. Appearing for oneself, as in the
case of one who does not retain a lawyer and appears for himself in court."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1099 (5th ed. 1979).
76. See generally Comment, The Pro Se Defendant: No Right To Say No, 23
EMORY L.J. 53 (1974); Note, The Right To Defend Pro Se in Criminal Proceedings,
1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 679.
77. For a complete discussion of the rights and limitations of self-representa-
tion see Note, The Right To Defend Pro Se: Faretta v. California and Beyond, 40
ALB. L. REV. 423 (1976); Note, Criminal Defendants At The Bar of Their Own De-
fense-Faretta v. California, 13 AM. CRaM. L. REV. 335 (1975); Note, A Constitu-
tional Right to Self-Representation-Faretta v. California, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 774
(1976); Note, Faretta v. California: The Law Helps Those Who Help Themselves, 28
HASTINGS L.J. 283 (1976); Comment, The Constitutional Right of Self-Representa-
tion Faretta and the "Assistance of Counsel," 3 PEPPERDNE L. REV. 336 (1976).
78. 422 U.S. at 819-20.
79. Id. at 820.
80. Id. (footnote omitted).
81. "An unwanted counsel 'represents' the defendant only through a tenuous
and unacceptable legal fiction. Unless the accused has acquiesced in such repre-
sentation, the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed him by the Consti-
tution, for, in a very real sense, it is not his defense." Id. at 821 (emphasis in
original).
82. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
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fuse to accept all guilty pleas;8 3 it may also choose to limit such
pleas without running afoul of the Faretta guarantee of self-repre-
sentation.84
Weighing against an individual's right to make his own plea and
conduct his own defense is a state's interest in the fair adminis-
tration of justice. The most pervasive idea found in the Chadd
opinion dealt with "the larger public interest at stake in pleas of
guilty to capital offenses." 85 The court, quoting Massie v. Sum-
ner,8 6 stated that "'California has a strong interest in the accu-
racy and fairness of its criminal proceedings.' 87 Further, the
majority recognized the great public interest served by the re-
quirement of counsel's consent as an "independent safeguard
against erroneous imposition of a death sentence."8 8 The majority
found support for these safeguards in the seriousness of the pro-
ceedings against a capital defendant. Pointing out that a guilty
plea served as a waiver of the defendant's right against self-in-
crimination, right of confrontation and right to trial by jury,89 as
well as, admitted all matters essential to conviction,90 and limited
the issues which could be raised on appeal.9 1 "In view of these
consequences, the legislature has demonstrated an increasing
concern to insure that no defendant enter a guilty plea in our
courts without fully understanding the nature and consequences
of his act."
9 2
83. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38-39 (1970). The Supreme Court
stated that it was possible for a state to refuse acceptance of all guilty pleas if it so
chose.
84. Refusal to accept all guilty pleas is just as much a burden on the right to
proceed pro se as conditioning such a plea on consent of counsel. In both in-
stances, the accused is limited concerning what action he may take. In fact,
Faretta itself puts restrictions on the exercise of the right of self-representation.
For admission of these restrictions see commentaries listed in note 77 supra.
85. 28 Cal. 3d at 747, 621 P.2d at 841, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
86. See note 53 supra.
87. 28 Cal. 3d at 753, 621 P.2d at 845, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 806 (quoting Massie v.
Sumner, 624 F.2d 72, 74 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.LW. 3494 (U.S. Jan. 12,
1981)).
88. Id. at 750, 621 P.2d at 843, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
89. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). The defendant, represented by
counsel, pled guilty to five counts of robbery and was sentenced to death. On ap-
peal the question of whether the guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent was not
raised. The court, believing these rights to be fundamental, reversed the convic-
tions for failure of the record to reflect such a waiver.
90. People v. DeVaughn, 18 Cal. 3d 889, 895, 558 P.2d 872, 875, 135 Cal. Rptr. 786,
789 (1977). The California Supreme Court reversed the conviction of two men who
had been induced to plead guilty under a plea bargain after they had been misled
into believing that certain issues of law regarding involuntariness of their confes-
sions were reviewable on appeal, when in fact they were not.
91. Id. at 895-96, 558 P.2d at 875, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 789. See generally Erickson,
The Finality of a Guilty Plea, 48 NoTRE DAME LAw 835 (1973).
92. 28 Cal. 3d at 748-49, 621 P.2d at 842, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
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The accurate administration of justice is the cornerstone of
criminal pleading in federal courts. According to Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 93 a defendant's right to
make a certain plea can be made conditional in the interest of jus-
tice. Among the requirements before a guilty plea may be ac-
cepted are that the defendant must be advised of his right to
counsel if he is not already represented by counsel; he must be
advised that a guilty plea will act as a waiver of his right to trial;
and finally, the court must determine that the plea is made volun-
tarily.94 As the United States Supreme Court has stated, a guilty
"plea must, of course, be voluntary and knowing and if it was in-
93. Rule 11 States, in pertinent part:
(a) Alternatives. A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or nolo con-
tendere. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails
to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
(b) Nolo Contendere. A defendant may plead nolo contendere only
with the consent of the court. Such a plea shall be accepted by the court
only after due consideration of the views of the parties and the interest of
the public in the effective administration of justice.
(c) Advice to Defendant. Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo con-
tendere, the court must address the defendant personally in open court
and inform him of, and determine that he understands, the following:
(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the
mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maxi-
mum possible penalty provided by law; and
(2) if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that he has
the right to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the pro-
ceeding against him and, if necessary, one will be appointed to repre-
sent him; and
(3) that he has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that
plea if it has already been made, and that he has the right to be tried
by a jury and at that trial has the right to the assistance of counsel,
the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, and
the right not to be compelled to incriminate himself; and
(4) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere there will not be a
further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo contendere
he waives the right to a trial; and
(5) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere, the court may ask
him questions about the offense to which he has pleaded, and if he an-
swers these questions under oath, on the record, and in the presence
of counsel, his answers may later be used against him in a prosecu-
tion for perjury or false statement.
(d) Insuring That the Plea is Voluntary. The court shall not accept a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first, by addressing the defend-
ant personally in open court, determining that the plea is voluntary and
not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agree-
ment. The court shall also inquire as to whether the defendant's willing-
ness to plead guilty or nolo contendere results from prior discussions
between the attorney for the government and the defendant or his attor-
ney.
FED. R. CRnm. P. 11.
94. See note 93 supra.
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duced by promises, the essence of those promises must in some
way be known. There is, of course, no absolute right to have a
guilty plea accepted." 95
Public interest concerns have prompted some states to go fur-
ther. Both New York96 and Louisiana 97 deny certain defendants98
the right to plead guilty, believing that such denial was not too
great a burden on the defendant's rights.99 By comparison, Cali-
fornia allows a defendant in a capital case to plead guilty but only
with the consent of counsel. 0 0 However, it is arguable that the
law in California, after the Chadd decision, will be the same as in
states such as New York and Louisiana. There will be very few
cases where an attorney will consent to a client's plea of guilty to
an offense for which the penalty is death or life imprisonment
without possibility of parole. Therefore, as a practical conse-
quence, the decision of the California Supreme Court in People v.
Chadd 101 has aligned California with those jurisdictions which re-
fuse to accept guilty pleas in capital cases. The Chadd decision
firmly established that not only is presence of counsel necessary
for the acceptance of a guilty plea in a capital case,102 but the ac-
tual consent of counsel is required as well.103 The Chadd court
stated that just as the right of self-representation may not be
used to circumvent the requirement of counsel, 04 the right of
self-representation also may not be used to circumvent the re-
quirement of counsel's consent. 10 5
Quite significantly, the decision has cleared the murky waters
95. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.. 257, 261-62 (1971) (citing Lynch v. Overhol-
ser, 369 U.S. 705, 719 (1962)).
96. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 220.10(s) (e) (McKinney Supp. 1980).
97. The Louisiana statute states: "A court shall not receive an unqualified
plea of guilty in a capital case. If a defendant makes such a plea, the court shall
order a plea of not guilty entered for him." LA. CODE CRuM. PRO. ANN. art. 557
(West Supp. 1981).
98. These statutes extend to those defendants subject to capital punishment
upon entering an unqualified guilty plea.
99. At least one commentator beheves that statutes such as these run against
the directive of the sixth amendment. See Note, The Right to "No Trial" and the
Right To "No Counsel," 4 VAL. U.L. REV. 163 (1969). "By statute, these states have
reworded the Sixth Amendment. They disregard the import of the wording that
the defendant shall enjoy the right to trial and consider a trial as being a sine qua
non." Id. at 167 (emphasis included).
100. See note 2 supra.
101. 28 Cal. 3d 739, 621 P.2d 837, 170 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1981).
102. The necessity of presence of counsel for the acceptance of a guilty plea
had already been duly established. See People v. Ballentine, 39 Cal. 2d 193, 246
P.2d 35 (1952).
103. 28 Cal. 3d at 749-50, 621 P.2d at 843, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
104. Id. at 754, 621 P.2d at 845, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
105. Id. at 753, 621 P.2d at 844, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
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left behind in the wake of People v. Teron,106 by dispelling all
doubts concerning recent amendments to penal code section
1018.107 In disapproving Teron, the Chadd court established that
a capital defendant has no right to plead guilty without consent of
counsel. 08
V. CONCLUSION
The decision in People v. Chadd has left little doubt as to the
meaning of the 1973 amendment to California Penal Code section
1018.109 The reasoning of the Chadd court that state interest in
the fair administration of criminal justice may outweigh certain
personal rights and prevent waiver of other rights, presents an op-
portunity for a myriad of similar arguments in a variety of areas
of the law.110 In the future, Chadd quite possibly will be cited for
the proposition that certain individual rights must be
subordinated in order to serve a greater state interest. 1 '
C. EQUAL PROTECTION
1. Affirmative Action in Law Schools: DeRonde v. Regents of
the University of California
University admissions programs have often been the topic of cases in-
volving affirmative action. Employing the United States Supreme Court
case of Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, the California
Supreme Court has recently approved a race conscious law school admis-
sions program in DeRonde v. Regents of the University of California. The
106. See notes 38 and 39 supra and accompanying text.
107. The law concerning guilty pleas was uncertain after Teron because of that
court's approval in dictum of the practice of accepting such pleas without the con-
sent of counsel contrary to section 1018 of the penal code. See People v. Teron, 23
Cal. 3d at 115, 588 P.2d at 779, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
108. 28 Cal. 3d at 749-50, 621 P.2d at 843, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
109. Id.
110. For example, courts might decide that a greater amount of education or le-
gal expertise should be required of a defendant in order to proceed pro se. Or al-
ternatively, courts might find that a greater degree of mental competency must be
present when a defendant requests to represent himself. It is even conceivable
that courts, in the name of adequate criminal justice, might more readily find that
because- of the importance of jury trials, a criminal defendant should not be given
the opportunity to waive trial by jury under any circumstances.
111. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The United States Supreme
Court held that although a woman has an undisputed right concerning the termi-
nation of her pregnancy, such right only exists through the first trimester since af-
ter that time the state has a compelling interest in both the lives of the fetus and
the mother.
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court compared the present situation to that in Bakke and found the objec-
tionable aspects of Bakke absent in the DeRonde case.
I. INTRODUCTION
The California Supreme Court case of DeRonde v. Regents of the
University of California I resulted in a practical application of the
United States Supreme Court case of Bakke v. Regents of the Uni-
versity of California.2 Both cases address the propriety of racial
preferences in university admissions policies. The extraordinary
interest generated by this issue in the legal community recently
prompted Justice Brennan to comment that "[f Iew constitutional
questions in recent history have stirred as much debate."3
Specifically, the issue addressed in DeRonde was whether ad-
missions procedures, which permitted consideration of "ethnic
minority status" as a factor in the selection of the 1975 first year
class at the University of California at Davis School of Law, was
"violative of the equal protection quarantees afforded nonminori-
ties under the federal or state Constitutions."4 The California
court, relying heavily on Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, con-
cluded that they were not.5
1. 28 Cal. 3d 875, 625 P.2d 220, 172 Cal. Rptr. 677 (1981).
2. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). The Bakke case originated from the California courts,
involving an admissions policy employed by the same University being challenged
by the present case. The DeRonde case represents the first time that the Califor-
nia Supreme Court has been able to apply the theoretical framework designed by
the Bakke Court. See, e.g., A Symposium: Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke, 67 CAIF. L. REV. 1 (1979); Darst & Horowitz, The Bakke Opinions and
Equal Protection Doctrine, 14 HARv. C.F. - C.L.L. REv. 7 (1979); Lesnick, What Does
Bakke Require of Law Schools?, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 141 (1979); Stone, Equal Protec-
tion In Special Admissions Programs.: Forward from Bakke, 6 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 719 (1979).
3. Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 350 (1974). The DeFunis case involved an
admissions policy much like the Davis's policy of racial preference. The United
States Supreme Court determined that the case was moot because DeFunis had
later been admitted to the law school, and was about to graduate.
4. 28 Cal. 3d at 879, 625 P.2d at 222, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
5. Id. Powell begins his discussion on equal protection by noting that
"(r)acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call
for the most exacting judicial examination." 438 U.S. at 291. This statement could
be labeled Justice Powell's topic sentence. Accordingly, any interest of the gov-
ernment that is used as a basis for these distinctions would have to be "compel-
ling." Id. at 309.
The interest of the University was then identified as the freedom to formulate its
own admissions policy as an aspect of academic freedom, which is, in the abstract,
an interest of compelling importance. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1976).
Justice Powell simply says: "The atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment and cre-
ation;'-so essential to the quality of higher education-is widely believed to be
promoted by a diverse student body." 438 U.S. at 312. The University's interest,
however, was dwarfed when weighed against the rights of Bakke. Justice Powell
explains that "Fourteenth Amendment (rights) are, by its terms, guaranteed to
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II. FACTS OF THE CASE
The appellant, Glen DeRonde, a white male, unsuccessfully
sought enrollment in the law school at the University of Califor-
nia at Davis in 1975.6 DeRonde sought mandamus in the superior
court against the Regents of the University of California to com-
pel his admission on the grounds that the school's admissions cri-
teria were unconstitutional because of the preferences given to
minority applicants.7 In February of 1976, the trial court denied
DeRonde his requested relief by holding that he would have been
unsuccessful in his application even if the challenged procedures
had not been employed.8 The court, however, also found that the
University's admissions procedures were "facially discrimina-
tory"9 and violated the equal protection clauses of both the state
and federal constitutions. As a result of this finding, the trial
court enjoined the University from further use of this admission
criteria.10
The University's admissions procedure consisted of a formula
which combined an applicant's previous academic grade point av-
erage with his or her score on the law school admission test
(LSAT). This formula produced a predicted first year average
which was designed to predict each applicant's performance in
law school. Like other law schools,"1 however, the University rec-
the individual." Id. at 289. This is the basis for Powell's decision regarding the
equal protection issue in Bakke.
The "fatal flaw" in the structure of the admission policy in Bakke was that it did
not consider the "individual" for every available seat. Rather, the policy precluded
white, male applicants from 16 seats of the incoming class of 1975. This was
viewed, by Powell, as being a violation of Mr. Bakke's fourteenth amendment
rights to equal protection.
6. 28 Cal. 3d at 879, 625 P.2d at 222, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 679. On the basis of the
criteria described in the text, 406 applicants were extended offers of admission.
DeRonde was not one of these.
7. Id. at 879, 625 P.2d at 222, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
8. Id. at 879, 625 P.2d at 222, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 679. Undoubtedly this involved a
statistical analysis performed by comparing DeRonda's qualifications with those of
the average minority applicant accepted. See note 45 infra and accompanying
text.
9. Id. at 879, 625 P.2d at 222, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
The trial court enjoined the University from utilizing any admissions criteria
based on an applicant's race, color, or ethnic origin. To this, the University re-
sponded with an appeal filed in the California Supreme Court.
10. 28 Cal. 3d at 879, 625 P.2d at 222, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
11. At least two major law schools are specifically mentioned within the Bakke
cases. The University of Washington's Law School was the subject in the United
States Supreme Court case of DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). Another
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ognized that this formula did not consider other significant and
relevant selection factors. Consequently, certain other non-meri-
torious factors were considered, such as previous work experi-
ence, extracurricular activities, recommendations, economic
disadvantage, and "ethnic minority status."' 2
The University's stated purpose for considering ethnic minority
status was twofold: first, the minority representation was thought
to "contribute a valuable cultural diversity,"13 and second, the in-
crease in minority professionals would "strengthen and preserve
minority participation in the democratic process at all levels."14
The mechanics of minority consideration operated to adjust the
predicted first year average either up or down.15 The University
policy which is mentioned is Harvard's program, which also incorporates a racial
preference in its application process. See note 35 infra and accompanying text.
12. 28 Cal. 3d at 880, 625 P.2d at 222, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 679. 'Ethnic minority sta-
tus" was defined by the University as including Asians, Blacks, Chicanos, native
Americans, and Philipinos. This group generally corresponds with the ethnic cate-
gories defined by the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in its
public reports." Id. at 881, 625 P.2d at 223, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
13. Id. at 881, 625 P.2d at 223, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 680. While Justice Powell, in the
Bakke decision, recognizes that diversity among a student body is a compelling
interest of the University:
(T) he nature of the state interest that would justify consideration of race
or ethnic background ... is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity .
The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far
broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic
origin is but a single through important element. The petitioner's special
admissions program, focused solely on ethnic diversity, would hinder
rather than further attainment of genuine diversity.
438 U.S. at 315 (emphasis in original). Diversity, then, contemplates something
higher than mere diversity in ethnic origin. The diversity sought by Davis in DeR-
onde was evidently aimed at ethnic diversity primarily.
14. 28 Cal. 3d at 881, 625 P.2d at 223, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 680. The argument for
strengthening minority participation is not unique to the case at hand. In Bakke v.
Regents of the University of California, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr.
680 (1976), the California Supreme Court reviewed the same argument: "We reject
the University's assertion that the special admission program may be justified as
compelling on the ground that minorities would have more rapport with doctors of
their own race and that black doctors would have a greater interest in treating dis-
eases prevalent among blacks." Id. at 53, 553 P.2d at 1165, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 693. The
California court in Bakke then cited the DeFunis case as holding that
(t)he Equal Protection Clause commands the elimination of racial barri-
ers, not their creation in order to satisfy our theory as to how society
ought to be organized. The purpose of the University of Washington can-
not be to produce black lawyers for blacks, polish lawyers for Poles, Jew-
ish lawyers for Jews, Irish lawyers for Irish. It should be to produce good
lawyers for Americans ....
Id. (quoting DeFunis, 416 U.S. 312, 342 (1974)).
15. Just as a relatively low PFYA (predicted first year average) might be in-
creased by utilization of any of the foregoing factors, a relatively high PFYA could
be reduced by considering (1) the applicant's prior schools attended; (2) the diffi-
culty of his or her prior course of study; (3) variations in an applicants multiple
LSAT (law school admissions test) scores; (4) the absence of any factors indicat-
ing maturing or motivation; and (5) the applicant's advanced age. 28 Cal. 3d at 881,
625 P.2d at 223, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
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emphasized that the minority status was merely one of several
factors considered in admissions and that it was not employing a
quota system wherein a certain number of positions were re-
served exclusively for minority applicants. 16
III. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
The California Supreme Court began its analysis of the case by
questioning whether or not it was proper to hear the case in light
of subsequent developments. The record shows that DeRonde
had graduated from another law school and had been admitted to
the California State Bar.17 Essentially, the issue was viewed as
being moot. The court noted, however, that the parties were urg-
ing the court to resolve the issues because of the "cloud of uncer-
tainty over the University's multiple and widely used
procedures."' 8 In light of the continuing statewide interest in
"race conscious" administrative programs generally, the court
agreed to hear the case. In doing so, the court found "ample pre-
cedent for appellate resolution of important issues . .. which
otherwise may have been rendered moot and of no further imme-
diate concern to the initiating parties."19
16. The distinction drawn by the University was specifically meant to distin-
guish this case from the situation in Bakke. See note 41 infra.
17. 28 Cal. 3d at 879, 625 P.2d at 222, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 679. The facts clearly indi-
cate that DeRonde is no longer seeking admission to the law school at Davis. The
Federal Constitution requires there be a "case and controversy" before deciding a
particular case. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The controversy must exist at all stages of
review, not merely when the complaint is filed. The United States Supreme Court
"does not sit to decide arguments after events have put them to rest." Doremus v.
Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 433 (1952). Certain issues, however, are "capable
of repetition, yet evading review." Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 401 (1975) (quoting
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333 n.2.) Such appears to be the case in DeRonde.
Unsuccessful applicants to law school are very likely to seek admission elsewhere
so that by the time a case is eligible for review, the controversy would no longer
exist.
id. 28 Cal. 3d at 879, 625 P.2d at 222, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 679. The plaintiff used the
argument that these procedures are "multiple and widely used" to support the no-
tion that the issue is capable of repetition, yet evading review. Id.
19. Id. The court cited Johnson v. Hamilton, 15 Cal. 3d 461, 541 P.2d 881, 125
Cal. Rptr. 129 (1975), as holding that "a case is not moot from the fact alone that
the issue in the case is of no further immediate interest to the person raising it."
Id. at 880, 625 P.2d at 222, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 679, (quoting Johnson, 15 Cal. 3d at 465,
541 P.2d at 882, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 130). Although the court only cited the Johnson
case, there does exist "ample authority" for the above proposition. See, e.g.,
Gordon v. Justice Court, 12 Cal. 3d 323, 326 n.1, 525 P.2d 72, 74 n.1, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632,
634 n.1 (1974); Zeilenga v. Nelson, 4 Cal. 3d 716, 719-720, 484 P.2d 578, 579, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 602, 603 (1971); For example, in In re William M., 3 Cal. 3d 16, 23, 473 P.2d 737,
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. As a preliminary matter, the supreme court informed the par-
ties that its analysis of the federal constitutional issues of the
case was "both aided and controlled by the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in University of California Regents v.
Bakke ."20
A. The Bakke Decision
A separate analysis of the Bakke v. Regents of the University of
California21 decision is necessary to understand the California
court's dependence on that case. In Bakke, the United States
Supreme Court for the first time decided a "reverse discrimina-
tion" case on its merits. While several equal protection issues
were left unsolved,22 Bakke did establish a significant precedent
by upholding affirmative action programs in principle, while strik-
ing down the special minority admissions program of the Medical
School of the University of California at Davis. 23 The California
Supreme Court in Bakke v. Regents of the University of Califor-
nia,24 decided, as they did in the present case, that the special ad-
missions program violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, but remanded the case for further consid-
eration of the appropriate remedy on the ground that Bakke's
showing of an equal protection violation shifted to the University
the burden of proving that he would not have been admitted even
without the special admissions program.25 The University con-
ceded that it was unable to carry this burden.26 The Supreme
741, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33, 37 (1970), the California Supreme Court noted that: "(I)f a
pending case poses an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur, the
court may exercise an inherent discretion to resolve that issue even though an
event occurring during its pendancy would normally render the matter moot."
20. 28 Cal. 2d at 882, 625 P.2d at 223, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 680, (emphasis in origi-
nal). The two cases, Bakke and DeRonde are remarkably similar except as to one
fact that becomes the primary focus in Bakke. DeRonde does not involve a racial
quota, the use of which rendered the admissions program in Bakke invalid.
21. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). As indicated earlier, the Court had been presented
with this issue once before, but dismissed the case as moot. DeFunis v. Odegaard,
416 U.S. 312 (1974); see note 3 supra.
22. See Lesnick, supra note 2.
23. The immediate effect of Bakke was the subject of the legal community for
quite some time, during which many projections and speculations were formed as
to its long-range impact. See The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARv. L. REV. 5,
131 n.4 (1978).
24. 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976). It is interesting to note
that the DeRonde case traveled through judicial channels as did Bakke, both be-
ginning in the Superior Court of Yolo County.
25. Id. at 63-64, 553 P.2d at 1172, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 700. Justice Tobriner filed a
dissenting opinion. Id. at 64, 553 P.2d at 1172, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
26. The disparity in the qualifications between Mr. Bakke and the average mi-
nority applicant who was accepted apparently was the barrier to the University's
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Court then ordered the school to admit Bakke.27
The United States Supreme Court decision in Bakke was se-
verely fragmented 28 with no more than four justices concurring in
reasoning on any one part. Five justices agreed that Bakke
should be admitted while a different set of five found that a school
may constitutionally consider race in its admissions program.29
Because Justice Powell represented the "swing" or pivotal vote in
Bakke, particular focus need be given to his views.3 0
ability to show that Bakke would not have been accepted absent the quota system.
See note 44 infra.
27. 18 Cal. 3d at 64, 553 P.2d at 1172, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
28. 438 U.S. 265. Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court. Jus-
tices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun filed a jointly written opinion, con-
curring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Justice Stevens, joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Stewart, concurred in the judg-
ment in part and dissented in part, thereby producing a five to four majority for
each of these two holdings. Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun wrote addi-
tional, separate dissents. This division within the Court stands in contrast to the
unanimous decision by the Supreme Court 24 years earlier in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which rejected the "separate but equal" philosophy
in public education.
29. Justice Powell's decision in Bakke touches common ground with (1)
Bakke's admission, and (2) the use of race in admissions programs. The later
point was shared by the group consisting of Justices Brennan, White, Marshall,
and Blackmun but for different reasons. The Brennan group candidly embraces
racial preferences that are soundly designed to remedy the effects of our society's
history of systematic subordination of minorities, 483 U.S. at 362-63 (Brennan,
White, Marshall, Blackmun, J.J., concurring and dissenting). This group of Jus-
tices felt that a racial classification for such purposes need not be subjected to the
extremely severe standard of judicial review that has been applied to discrimina-
tion that stigmatizes a group or works against a subordinated minority. Instead,
the Brennan group tests "benign" racial classification against the intermediate, al-
though "searching", standard of review which the Court has recently adopted for
cases of sex discrimination. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
Powell's opinion differs sharply on this point, stating that all classifications by
race, whether or not they produce immediately stigmatizing effects and whether or
not they work against subordinated minorities, demands the rigors of "strict scru-
tiny" in its strictest sense. 438 U.S. at 290-91.
30. On the question of issuing a mandatory injunction, Justice Powell agreed
with the four justices who agreed with Justice Stevens that Bakke's right to ad-
mission must be affirmed. But while their ground was that his exclusion was in
direct conflict with the words of section 601 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 601, 78 Stat. 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1978)). See 438
U.S. 408-21, Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part; joined by Burger,
C.J., Stewart, and Rehnquist, J.J.) Justice Powell's ground was that it amounted to
discrimination under the equal protection clause. However, the very setting of
limits on the permissible use of race criteria, which led Powell to conclude that
the use of numerical racial quotas was not permissible, also led him to conclude,
with respect to the validity of the Davis program, that the California Supreme
Court's prohibition of "any consideration of the race of any applicant," see 18 Cal.
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The California Supreme Court in DeRonde, in an independent
analysis of Justice Powell's role in Bakke, points out that the pri-
mary objection of the United State Supreme Court to Davis's ad-
missions policies was the quota system.31 In Bakke, the school
reserved sixteen of the one hundred available positions for minor-
ities. Powell's view of such a system was clearly reflected when
he indicated that the Davis procedure was one employing "an ex-
plicit racial classification never before countenanced by this
Court. It tells applicants who are not Negro, Asian, or Chicano
that they are totally excluded from a specific percentage of the
seats in an entering class."32 Although he concluded that any
race conscious classification must meet a compelling governmen-
tal interest analysis,33 Powell wrote that "the State has a substan-
tial interest that legitimately may be served by a properly devised
admissions program involving the competitive consideration of
race and ethnic origin."34
3d at 53-56, 553 P.2d at 1165-67, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 693-695, was too wide and must be
reversed. 438 U.S. at 320.
On this second issue, Justice Powell's concurrence moved to the opinion held by
the justices who sided with Justice Brennan. The delimitation of the permissible
consideration of race was the crhmmn ground between the two issues.
31. Indeed, the Court labels the quota system as the "fatal flaw". 438 U.S. at
320. This served as the basis for Powell's equal protection analysis. Having re-
served a specified number of seats exclusively to be filled by minorities, the Uni-
versity was denying the right of each applicant, regardless of race, to be
considered individually for each seat. Id.
32. Id. at 319.
33. Id. at 299, 305. See note 5 supra, for a discussion of the compelling state
interest involved in DeRonde. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun
concluded that "racial classification designed to further remedial purposes 'must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives." Id. at 359 (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S.
313, 317 (1977)). This requirement that a classification be substantially related to
an important governmental objective derives from the sex discrimnation cases, see,
e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), and represents an intermediate level
of scrutiny between strict scrutiny and the minimal review under a rational basis
test. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L REV. 1, 177-88 (1977). See gen-
erally, Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L
REV. 1, 20-24 (1972).
34. 438 U.S. at 320. It is unclear as to what would constitute a "properly de-
vised program" from reading the Bakke decision. One author suggests that
a university which elects to structure its law-school admissions program to meet
Justice Powell's criteria of constitutionality may act as follows:
a) Race or ethnic identity may be overtly employed as a factor enhanc-
ing the relative admissibility of minority applicants, provided that such
admissibility is not determined merely according to an absolute measure
of qualification or by a comparative ranking of minority applicants against
one another ....
b) A specific numerical objective for minority minority-student mem-
bership in the entering class may be employed as a guideline or goal for
those administering the program. ...
c) A law school may employ a committee to which members are as-
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Justice Powell expressly used the admissions procedure at
Harvard College as an example of a permissible racial preference.
At Harvard, diversity is achieved without the use of racial quo-
tas.35 While race is a consideration for application, no one is pre-
cluded from competing for all available seats. The California
Supreme Court found Powell's description and evaluation of
Harvard's program to be significant: "In such an admissions pro-
gram, race or ethnic background may be deemed a 'plus' in a par-
ticular applicant's file, yet it does not insulate the individual from
comparison with all other candidates for the available seats."36
The California Supreme Court joined with Powell in viewing such
a policy as being flexible enough to consider all the pertinent
facts in each individual case while allowing "the weight attributed
to any one particular quality to vary from year to year," depend-
ing on the degree of racial diversity achieved.3 7 Powell's conclu-
sion, which was followed by the court in DeRonde, was that such
a program
treats each applicant as an individual .... The applicant who loses out
on the last available seat to another candidate receiving a 'plus' on the ba-
sis of ethnic background will not have been foreclosed from all considera-
tion for that seat simply because he was not the right color or had the
wrong surname. 38
signed on the basis of their racial or ethnic identification to administer a
minority-admissions program....
See Lesnick, supra note 2, at 157.
35. Harvard does not set "target-quotas." 438 U.S. at 316. However, it recog-
nizes that the advantages of diversity among its students "cannot be provided
without some attention to numbers." Id. at 323. While no minimum number is
established, Harvard's committee "pays some attention to distribution among
many types and categories of students," and one basis of categorization is race.
Id. at 324.
36. Id. at 317 (footnote omitted). The United States Supreme Court continues
by indicating that "(t)he file of a particular black applicant may be examined for
his potential contribution to diversity without the factor of race being decisive
when compared." Id. Such a statement would seem to preclude race from being
given excessive consideration. Once again, the problem remains in the ambiguity
left by Bakke concerning the proper weight to be given race in any admissions
program. The Harvard program merely serves as a model of what would be per-
missible while Bakke attempts to decide where, in any particular case, an admis-
sions program falls within this wide spectrum.
37. Id. at 317-18.
38. Id. at 318. The Court here is emphasizing that all important factors about
an applicant would combine together to determine any applicant's qualifications,
although several of these factors may be subjective. In such a situation, all appli-
cant's qualifications are "weighed fairly and competitively, and he would have no
basis to complain of unequal treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. It
is interesting to note, however, that most, if not all, of these non-objective factors
are qualifications over which the applicant can exercise control, except race.
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The California court then compares the admissions policy in
DeRonde with that of Harvard. The conclusion reached was that
"the admissions procedures used by the University [in DeRonde ]
to select its 1975 entering class at King Hall does not vary in any
significant way from the Harvard program."39 It is interesting to
note that similar, indeed identical, results could occur under ei-
ther the admissions policy in DeRonde or in Bakke. Under the
admissions plan in DeRonde, which was approved by the Califor-
nia court, DeRonde's race would represent a handicap or
nonadvantage in the competition for every seat at the law school.
On the other hand, in Bakke, the plaintiff's race was not the same
kind of handicap because the competition between white students
was for a slightly smaller number of seats. Such students were
not in competition for the places reserved for minorities.40 Statis-
tically, however, the plaintiff's overall chance for admission would
have been the same under the Bakke plan or under DeRonde:41
39. 28 Cal. 3d at 884, 625 P.2d at 225, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 682. In both the DeRonde
and Harvard programs, minority racial or ethnic origin was one of several compet-
ing factors employed by the schools to reach their ultimate decision on whether to
admit an applicant. Each applicant was individually evaluated in light of the vari-
ous positive or negative factors concerning their qualifications. Justice Powell ob-
served that the primary defect in the Bakke program was that the quota system
precluded individualized consideration of each applicant. 438 U.S. at 317-18, n.52.
40. Although details of the regular admissions program in Bakke are not pro-
vided in the briefs or the opinions, apparently race per se would be a factor in the
regular selection process only because there were fewer seats for which white stu-
dents could compete. See 438 U.S. at 275. Neither the Harvard/DeRonde plans nor
the Bakke plan could be grossly different in result, if for example, Harvard had
attached an enormous negative weight to being white or the plan in Bakke had
reserved the bulk of its seats for blacks. In contrast, in any given year, whites
might receive significantly more favorable treatment under one plan than the
other. For instance, if in one year minority applicants appeared unusually weak,
whites could fare better under a flexible, Harvard-type plan. The point being that
neither scheme is intrinsically more fair than the other in terms of the overall sta-
tistical chance of being admitted.
41. The most obvious difference between the Justices who supported Bren-
nan's opinion and that of Justice Powell is the sharp distinction between the im-
permissible use of racial quotas either as an end in itself or as a means to achieve
a percentage representation and the permissible use of race as one preferential
factor among others:
There is no sensible, and certainly no constitutional, distinction between,
for example, adding a set number of points to the admissions rating of dis-
advantaged minority applicants as an expression of the preference with
the expectation that this will result in the admission of an approximately
determined number of qualified minority applicants and setting a fixed
number of places for such applicants as was done here.
438 U.S. at 378 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, J.J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
Justice Blackmun's separate opinion similarly questioned the validity of the line
between the Powell-disapproved "two-track (race) system" and the Powell-ap-
proved Harvard College system where race and ethnic background is only one of
many factors. "(T)he cynical . . ." he observed, "may say that under a program
such as Harvard's one may accomplish covertly what Davis concedes it does
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the admission plan approved in DeRonde could covertly achieve
the same result that the quota system was forbidden to achieve in
Bakke.
B. Statistical Approach
The United States Supreme Court in Bakke found that the
medical school failed to show that Bakke would not have been ad-
mitted absent the unlawful special admissions program which re-
served sixteen of the one hundred seats for minorities. Thus,
Bakke was entitled to the relief of being admitted to school.4 2 A
similar analysis was employed by the trial court in the DeRonde
decision. The superior court found that DeRonde would have
been unsuccessful in his application even if the "challenged pro-
cedures" 43 had not been used. The California Supreme Court, in
its majority decision, later made a curious application of this anal-
ysis.
As was the case in Bakke, a statistical analysis is appropriate in
determining what would have happened absent the racial prefer-
ence.4 4 The California Supreme Court in DeRonde considered the
statistical evidence in another light which was quite different
openly"; but he thought that he program in Bakke was constitutional, "though per-
haps barely so." 438 U.S. at 406 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
42. The Supreme Court held that
(W)ith respect to respondent's entitlement to an injunction directing his
admission to the Medical School, petitioner (the University) has conceded
that it could not carry its burden of proving that, but for the existence of
its unlawful special admissions program, respondent still would not have
been admitted. Hence, respondent is entitled to the injunction....
438 U.S. at 320. Essentially, the Court was saying that while race may be consid-
ered in an admissions program, the University must also show that absent that ra-
cial preference, the rejected applicant would still not have qualified.
43. 28 Cal. 3d at 879, 675 P.2d at 222, 172 Cal. Rptr. 679. Details are not given as
to the basis for the superior court's finding.
44. The following statistics reflect the admissions results for the two years in
which Bakke applied to medical school:
Class Entering in 1973
Grade point
average *Verbal Quantitative Science Gen. Infor.
Bakke ............... 3.46 96 94 97 72
Average of
regular admittees .... 3.49 81 76 83 69
Average of
Minority admittees... 2.88 46 24 35 33
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from that used by the United States Supreme Court in Bakke.
The California court recognized that "facially valid procedure [s]
may in [their] actual application produce a constitutionally dis-
criminatory result."45 Instead of speculating about what might
have been, the court held that the statistics showed no deliberate
use of the challenged admissions procedure as a "cover" for a
quota system. 46 Essentially, the court was saying that it found no
Class Entering in 1974
Grade point
average Verbal Quantitative Science Gen. Infor.
Bakke ............... 3.46 96 94 97 72
Average of
regular admittees .... 3.29 69 67 82 72
Average of
minority admittees .... 2.62 34 30 37 18
438 U.S. at 277 n.7. *(The last four columns are sections to the MCAT).
The above statistics obviously indicate that race was given a tremendous
amount of weight in view of the disparity between Bakke's qualifications and
those of the minority student admitted. 28 Cal. 3d at 886, 625 P.2d at 225, 172 Cal.
Rptr. at 683.
45. The statistical evidence in DeRonde was considered very briefly by the
majority despite the fact that the Supreme Court decision in Bakke was virtually
controlled by the inequity that the statistics illustrated. The admissions statistics
for the year in which DeRonde applied to the law school at Davis are as follows:
Class Entering in 1975
Grade point average Law School Admission Test
DeRonde .................... 3.74 575
Average of
Regular Admittees ........... 3.57 676
Average of
Minority Admittees .......... 3.27 551
DeRonde's predicted first year average was 2.70, higher than 72 ethnic minorities
admitted. His law school admission test score, was higher than 88 admittees, 78 of
whom were minorities. His writing ability score was higher than 36 admittees, 33
of whom were minorities.
For the academic year of 1975-76, the following statistics emerged: 1,188 white
males applied; 175 (or 13%) were admitted; 458 minorities applied; 133 (or 29%)
were admitted. Forty-six percent of the entering class was comprised of minori-
ties.
For previous years the acceptance percentage of minority applicants indicates a
clear pattern: in 1972, 5% of white male applicants were accepted; 23% of minority
applicants were accepted. In 1973, 8% of white male applicants were accepted;
24% of minority applicants were accepted. This information was compiled from 28
Cal. 3d at 899, 625 P.2d at 234, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
While the majority in DeRonde analyzed these figures primarily for the purpose
of finding a possible disproportionate impact, the disparity between DeRonde's
qualifications and those of the average minority is not unlike that presented in
Bakke.
46. 28 Cal. 3d at 887, 625 P.2d at 227, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 684.
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intent to discriminate.4 7 The showing of intent is a required ele-
ment when attempting to invalidate a neutral procedure 48 be-
cause of the disproportionate impact it has when applied. The
court in DeRonde held that there was no evidence to "support a
finding of such disproportionate impact."49
C. California Constitutional Analysis
The appellant, DeRonde, urged the California Supreme Court to
find that the admissions policy of racial preference violated the
equal protection guarantees of article I, section 7 of the California
Constitution.50 The court begins its analysis of this issue by rec-
ognizing that on several occasions a majority of the California
Supreme Court had "departed from applicable federal precedents
in reliance upon state constitutional principles." 51 The most nota-
ble of these occasions was Serrano v. Priest.52 In Serrano, the
court indicated that the equal protection guarantees contained in
article I, section 7 of the Californa Constitution "afford protec-
tions different from, and independent of, those extended by the
Fourteenth Amendment." 53
47. Id.
48. Laws or other official actions that are racially neutral on their face and that
rationally serve a permissible governmental end do not violate the equal protec-
tion clause simply because they have a racially discriminatory impact. A violation
requires that the governmental action have a discriminatory purpose, i.e., inten-
tional or deliberate discrimination must be shown. See Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976).
49. 28 Cal. 3d at 888, 625 P.2d at 227, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 684. The court recognized,
however, DeRonde's argument that: "How can there be said to exist no 'dispropor-
tionate impact' when extremely well-qualified male Caucasian applicants out-
number poorly-qualified minority applicants by over three to one and are
admitted to the school in a lesser percentage?" Id. at 889, 625 P.2d at 227, 172 Cal.
Rptr. at 684. (emphasis in original).
50. CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. I, § 21 (current version at CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7).
51. 28 Cal. 3d at 889, 625 P.2d at 228, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
52. 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976). In Serrano, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court stated that
our state equal protection provisions, while substantially the equivalent of
the guarantees contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution are possessed of an independent vitality which, in a
given case, may demand an analysis different from that which would ob-.
tain if only the federal standard were applicable.
Id. at 764, 557 P.2d at 950, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 366. The state high court, on that occa-
sion, went as far as to say that "decisions of the United States Supreme Court de-
fining fundamental rights are persuasive authority to be afforded respectful
consideration, but are to be followed by California courts only when they provide
no less individual protection than is guaranteed by California law." Id.
53. 28 Cal. 3d at 889, 625 P.2d at 278, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
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To this contention, however, the court responded with the case
of Price v. Civil Service Commission,54 which established that in
the area of minority advancement programs, "the state Constitu-
tion imposes no greater restrictions than similar guarantees pro-
vided by the federal charter."55 In other words, in the context of
affirmative action programs, if a particular program is found to be
permissible under the United States Constitution, it will be also
permitted under the California Constitution. Here, the Davis ad-
mission program withstood the analysis under the United States
Constitution and accordingly was found valid under the state
charter.
D. The California Supreme Court's Conclusion
The California Supreme Court considered several factors: (1)
the Bakke decision; (2) the statistical evidence presented; and (3)
the lack of merit to the California constitutional claim. These fac-
tors combined together in the court's conclusion to produce a
finding that the challenged admissions procedure was permissible
under both the state and federal constitutions.56 Of these factors,
the most significant was clearly the Bakke decision.57 Although
the majority in DeRonde was convinced by Powell's analysis of
Harvard's admissions policies and found no significant differences
between Harvard's and those policies in DeRonde, the portion of
the Bakke decision that served most as a foundation for this deci-
sion was specifically mentioned by the court. "Of even greater
importance to the resolution of the present case. . ., (was that) a
separate but clear majority of the high court (Justices Powell,
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun) indicated approval of
race conscious admissions programs similar to the University's
procedure under scrutiny here."58 Essentially, after having estab-
lished that policies in DeRonde were not a quota system, the Cali-
fornia court labeled these policies as being merely part of a "race
conscious admissions program" which was clearly approved by
the United States Supreme Court.
54. 26 Cal. 3d 257, 604 P.2d 1365, 161 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1980). The Price case in-
volved an affirmative action being employed by the Civil Service Commission of
Sacramento County. The racially-conscious program was struck down on the
grounds that it had a racially discriminatory impact and that it was not job related.
55. 28 Cal. 3d at 889, 625 P.2d at 228, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 685. The court's point
here is that if the program at Davis withstood an analysis under the federal Con-
stitution, it will also satisfy any state constitutional requirement.
56. 28 Cal. 3d at 890, 625 P.2d at 229, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 686.
57. The entire opinion in DeRonde was paralleled to the Bakke decision. In
fact, without the Bakke decision to serve as a pattern, the court's analysis could
have been quite different. From the beginning, the court's decision travels
through the same considerations as the court in Bakke.
58. 28 Cal. 3d at 882, 625 P.2d at 223, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
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The issue was undoubtedly framed in this manner in order to
reach the court's desired result. The decision in DeRonde ap-
pears to hinge on the mechanical distinction that there was no
quota system present and seems to ignore the practical results
produced by the program at Davis. Had the issue been framed
with its primary focus on the effect such an admissions policy had
on its applicants, the DeRonde decision would have endorsed a
different holding. In contrast, the Supreme Court in Bakke was
significantly influenced by the disparity between Bakke's qualifi-
cations and those of the average minority applicant accepted.5 9
The use of such an analysis in DeRonde would have probably pro-
moted a different conclusion. While the disparity in DeRonde was
not as severe as that illustrated in Bakke,60 the court would have
had to make a determination as to how much disparity is required
in order to render an affirmative action program invalid. Such an
analysis would have provided answers for the unanswered ques-
tions in DeRonde concerning the future use of race conscious ad-
missions programs and their disparate treatment of applicants.
IV. THE DIssENT IN DERONDE
The dissent, written by Justice Mosk, begins with an emotional
appeal.61 The dissenting justice expresses deep disappointment
in the majority for having rejected the plea "for a colorblind
America, the rallying cry for civil rights martyrs from William
Lloyd Garrison to Martin Luther King."62 Justice Mosk then
makes an analogy between the present case and that point in
American history when an entire race of people was placed in
camps during the Second World War.63 Essentially, the point
59. See note 44 supra.
60. See note 45 supra.
61. 28 Cal. 3d at 891, 625 P.2d at 229, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 686. Justice Mosk begins
his dissent by claiming that
(t)he majority opinion, I regret to say, was preordained. Any court that
would stray so far from basic principles of constitutional equal protection
as to approve a rigid racial quota system in public employment (referring
to the Price case) can be expected to accept any program of race con-
sciousness in public education. But repetition does not disinfect, it exac-
erbates legal and social error. Id.
62. Id.
63. The court here is referring to two of the most "universally discredited
cases in modern American legal history." Id. at 892, 625 P.2d at 230, 172 Cal. Rptr.
at 686. In Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), the United States Supreme Court legitimized the
use of race as a basis, during wartime, to place a stigma upon an entire race of
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made is that the majority's decision is an attempt to turn the cal-
endar back several decades in regards to civil rights. The irony of
the dissent's position is quite apparent, however, in light of the
desired conclusion expressed by Justice Mosk. Having used ex-
amples such as "Martin Luther King," one would assume, ini-
tially, that the dissent's complaint would be that the majority's
decision had not gone far enough in protecting and promoting mi-
norities' rights. Justice Mosk, instead, puts forth the classic case
of "reverse discrimination."64 The dissent cites Professor Kitch,
referring to the apparent inequities in any system which is race
conscious: "'Will this not be a particular problem for the young,
who, having grown up on this side of the civil rights revolution,
disassociate themselves from the racism of the old America, and
may be surprised to learn that they are asked to pay for it?' ",65
The dissent also notes that "(n)o one (including the majority)
has cited any constitutional authority66 that requires or permits
some kind of statistical parity among applicants on the basis of
race, color, sex, or national origin; if there can be no proportionate
representation, it seems obvious there can be no disproportionate
underrepresentation."67 Basically, this position views any set
formula of how many minorities there should be in any given
group as a "mockery of the traditional democratic theory of selec-
people through government action which has since been recognized as being un-
warranted. See, e.g., Rostowe, The Japanese American Cases-Disaster, 54 YALE
L.J. 489 (1945).
The dissent points out that the Court in Bakke cited both Korematsu and Hira-
bayashi in their approval of race as a permissible factor to be considered in school
admissions.
The analogy drawn here may be strained in light of the context in which Kore-
matsu and Hirabayashi were decided. These two cases are generally recognized
as bastardizations of constitutional law, see Rostowe, supra, at 489; they were not
the product of such careful deliberation as was the case in DeRonde.
64. The dissent makes an appeal to the minority's sense of pride by informing
the applicants that "any scheme involving preferences to some races contains the
clear message that members of those races are inferior and unable to compete on
a basis of equality." 28 Cal. 3d at 905, 625 P.2d at 237, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 694. Reverse
discrimination occurs when "any affirmative action plan that counts blackness af-
firmatively, even in the context of numerous other factors, necessarily results in
the rejection of some appicants who would not be rejected were they black, and in
that sense are being turned away, 'only' because they were not black". Id. at 904,
625 P.2d at 237, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 694. (citing J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT 257
n.102 (1980)).
65. 28 Cal. 3d at 896, 625 P.2d at 232, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 689. (citing Kitch, The
Return of Color-Consciousness to the Constitution: Weber, Dayton, and Columbus,
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 13 (1979).
66. 28 Cal. 3d at 895, 625 P.2d at 232, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
67. 28 Cal. 3d at 895, 625 P.2d at 232, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 689. The majority, in their
opinion, raised the issue of "disproportionate underrepresentation of minorities"
at Davis. The dissent views this as a "strange new concept that is creeping into
legal literature." Id.
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tion on the basis of individual merit."68
The dissent rejects two theories discussed by both Bakke and
the majority in DeRonde: (1) that preferential treatments serve
as a reparation for past societal discrimination against ethnic mi-
norities, and (2) that the program is designed to promote diver-
sity among the student body at Davis law school.
The first class of these theories, the dissent asserts, would only
be conceivable if "(a) the minority applicants personally had
been the victims of educational discrimination, and (b) the re-
jected majority applicants, including DeRonde, had personally
committed or had been the beneficiaries of acts of discrimina-
tion."69 Justice Mosk advocates a direct correlation between af-
firmative action and culpability of past discrimination. In other
words, before any reverse discrimination is permitted, there
should be a showing of past discrimination connected directly to
the party now being discriminated against.
As to the second theory, the dissent cited Professor Alan Der-
showitz of Harvard as saying that "(t)he checkered history of 'di-
versity' demonstrates that it was designed largely as a cover to
achieve other legally, morally, and politically controversial
goals. ' 70 The court continued by indicating that the Professor
Dershowitz's inescapable conclusion was that to "give members
of a minority race a preference in admissions is simply to reward
them for the accident of their race, a fact that has no relevancy to
68. Id. California Supreme Court Justice Mosk feels that such a formula for
statistical parity would also violate the prohibition on the unconstitutional effect
of racial quotas.
69. Id. The dissent illustrates the possible inequities under such a system by
drawing an analogy to a recent political development:
The incongruity of group reparations rather than individual appraisal can
be illustrated by the recent black appointee to President Reagan's cabinet
as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development: Samuel Riley Pierce,
Jr., the son of a prosperous businessman, resident of a fashionable New
York suburb, honor graduate of an Ivy League University. Would Davis
be justified in rating Secretary Pierce's offspring, because of their color,
more deserving of preferential treatment than the offspring of a Caucasian
farm worker from the Imperical Valley, a Yugoslav fisherman from San
Pedro, or an Italian cobbler from San Francisco's North Beach?
Id. at 896 n.1, 625 P.2d at 232 n.1, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 689 n.1.
70. Id. at 897, 625 P.2d at 233, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 690. (quoting Dershowitz &
Hanft, Affirmative Action and the Harvard College Diversity-Discretion Model
Paradigm or Pretext? 1 CARDOzo L. REV. 379, 404, 407 (1979)). Professor Dersho-
witz concludes that "(t)o reward some persons for the accident of their race is in-
evitably to punish others for the accident of theirs." Id. at 420-421, (quoted in 28
Cal. 3d at 897, 625 P.2d at 233, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 690.)
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the purported goals of education for service in a profession."'71
The sharpest criticism raised against the DeRonde decision by
the dissent was directed at the majority's acceptance of the Uni-
versity's contention that race was merely one isolated, presuma-
bly minor factor in the selection process. 72 The dissent contends
that DeRonde "presented persuasive evidence that the Davis ad-
missions committee was predisposed to place undue emphasis
upon race."73 While the majority recognized that affirmative ac-
tion, in principle, was valid under Bakke, the issue of how much
emphasis would be proper was never addressed.7 4 Justice Mosk
continued in his criticism of the point by noting that "(w)hen to
that predisposition are added the figures of actual admissions to
Davis for the year when plaintiff applied,.., a clear discrimina-
tory pattern emerges."7 5 This statement is qualified by the admis-
sion that the foregoing procedure would be unobjectionable "if
the selected minority members were distinguished by criteria
other than race. ' 76 Nor would the process have been attacked if
such an increase in minorities could be effectuated without the
detrimental impact on nonminority, better qualified applicants. 77
The dissent expressed its belief that the trial court was in error in
concluding that DeRonde would have been unsuccessful in his ap-
plication even without the preferential treatment of minorities.
The statistical evidence presented7 8 was used to illustrate that
"without the preferential treatment of applicants-acceptance of
some and rejection of others on the basis of race-the plaintiff
would have been included among the successful applicants in
1975."79
The dissent's contention appears to be meritorious. Both the
California Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court
viewed the inability of the University to show Bakke would have
been rejected, regardless of the racial preference, as being signifi-
71. Id.
72. The statistics presented in note 45 supra indicate that race was given sig-
nificant weight in the admissions program. In light of the discrepancies between
DeRonde's qualifications and those of the average minority accepted, it is reason-
able to assume that race was the single most important factor.
73. 28 Cal. 3d at 898, 625 P.2d at 234, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 691. The composition of
the admission's committee was four of the six members were not only of "minority
ethnic backgrounds themselves but also were or had been active in organizations
dedicated to increasing the number of admittees from their particular racial group.
Under the circumstances the committee's objectivity was suspect at the outset."
Id.
74. See notes 25-26 supra.
75. 28 Cal. 3d at 898, 625 P.2d at 234, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 691. See note 34 supra.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See note 34 supra.
79. 28 Cal. 3d at 900, 625 P.2d at 235, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 692.
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cantly relevant to their decisions to invalidate the admissions pro-
gram. In essence, if statistics actually show, as the dissent
asserts, that DeRonde would have been admitted but for the ra-
cial preference, then this would seem to present a difficulty to the
majority's decision in DeRonde.
V. IMPACT
In final analysis, the overriding significance of DeRonde v. Re-
gents of University of California is the opportunity it provides us
with to view the principles of Bakke at work in a practical setting.
While there is certainly nothing new about these principles, their
application in DeRonde's admissions program serves as the first
testing ground since the Bakke decision. In light of the similarity
in the results of the admissions programs in these two cases,8 0
however, the distinction between what is constitutionally permis-
sible and what is not, remains somewhat clouded. This lack of
precision and clarity may well be the catalyst that sends the DeR-
onde case up the rungs of judicial review.
Any further consideration of the DeRonde case will undoubt-
edly involve a determination of whether the admissions policy at
the University actually promotes the desired racial diversity. 81
Though the criteria used by the University may include race, it
must also include a sufficient range of other criteria which genu-
inely serve to measure the potential contributions to diversity of
all applicants for admissions. 82
Ultimately, however, the distinction between the two cases is
the use of a racial quota. The presence of a racial quota in Bakke
80. See notes 44-45 supra. The similarity is the fact that both the Bakke and
DeRonde courts recognized that white, male applicants had superior qualifications
to those of the average, successful minority.
81. Justice Powell's opinion, and that of the majority, advocates the use of a
compelling state interest analysis, see notes 5 and 33 supra. Such an analysis calls
for a finding that the state governmental purpose, diversity, actually be promoted
by the actions taken by that governmental entity. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973). In that case the Supreme Court held that whenever this strict level of re-
view is employed, it must be shown that the governmental action is necessary to
promote some compelling state interest and that the action is the least burden-
some alternative available.
82. Cf. Blasi, Bakke as Precedent: Does Mr. Justice Powell Have a Theory?, 67
CALIF. L. REV. 21, 22-23, 61, 66 (1979). See also id. at 62-67, regarding various types
of race-conscious programs. Mr. Blasi considers alternative rationales for the
Powell position centered on the dignity of applicants and the reduction of racial
prejudice.
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was the "fatal flaw"; whereas, the absence of one in DeRonde was
the saving factor. The cynical observer, however, would view no
difference between that preference indirectly produced by a bas-
ket of factors, including race, and that produced by racial quo-
tas.83 Even though the exact percentage of representation of the
disadvantaged racial group may be achieved by both approaches,
one might ask whether there is a fundamental difference that
would warrant opposing holdings in Bakke and DeRonde.
As Justice Powell established, it is the individual with whom
the courts need to be concerned.84 When the impact of the two
approaches on individual applicants is examined, the direct and
indirect preferences are seen to be quite different. The para-
mount distinguishing feature is the different psychological effect
these two approaches have on applicants, particularly the white
applicants, who do not gain admission. In the face of direct racial
quotas, exclusion is felt to be based on an immutable characteris-
tic of the applicant for which he should feel no responsibility.
The fact, that many in the white community are conscious of the
past wrongs for which racial quotas are intended to compensate,
does not pacify the new feelings of injustice. Indeed, such a sense
of inequity may even promote rather than reduce racial tensions.
On the other hand, when several factors are combined to evi-
dence disadvantage of particular applicants, or of potential contri-
butions by them, most of these factors will not have the
immutability of race. In such a program, other elements may be
considered over which the applicant has total control such as
"unique work or service experience, leadership potential, matur-
ity, ... ability to communicate with the poor."8 Added to this
might be the capacity to contribute to solving social problems, bi-
lingualism and the like. No doubt there would still be complaints
from excluded whites, but these complaints may be met by the
fact that such an admissions program is designed to be as fair as
possible for all applicants and is consistent with the objective of
providing for an eventual compensation for the wrongs inflicted
by past discrimination.8 6
One senses from both the Bakke and DeRonde decisions, that
the courts are concerned with the "appearance of justice"87 and
83. See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
84. See note 5 supra.
85. 438 U.S. at 317.
86. See Bell, Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of Racial Reme-
dies, 67 CALF. L. REV. 3, 14-19 (1979). Professor Bell points out that black ad-
vances have historically involved, and continue to involve, changes in policies
which oppress certain layers of whites, as well as blacks. Cf. Blasi, supra note 82,
at 64-66.
87. 438 U.S. at 319 n.53.
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"the perception of mistreatment."88 The rigid and explicit racial
preference before the Court in Bakke was seen to be "viewed as
inherently unfair by the public generally as well as by applicants
for admissions to state universities."89 Under the DeRonde case
admission program, in which racial preference was given in a
framework of "individualized consideration," "(t)he applicant
who loses out on the last available seat to another candidate re-
ceiving a 'plus' on the basis of ethnic background will not have
been foreclosed from all consideration for that seat simply be-
cause he was not the right color or had the wrong surname."90
Not only will this blurring of the borders of preference insulate
the University from injunctive relief,91 but it will also reduce the
likelihood that rejected white applicants will focus on racial pref-
erence as the reason why they were rejected.
VI. CONCLUSION
DeRonde, then, becomes yet another step in defining the per-
missible boundaries of affirmative action. It is apparent that
these boundaries will tolerate a certain amount of disparate re-
sults so long as they are not achieved by the rejected method of
racial quotas.
II. ADMINISTRATIvE LAW
A. WELFARE LAW
1. Legislative Intent Creates Exception to General Rule
That Specific Statutes Preclude Prosecution for a Gen-
eral Crime: People v. Jenkins
The California Supreme Court in People v. Jenkins' recently es-
tablished an exception to the general rule that specific statutes
preclude the prosecution for a general crime.2 The issue
88. Id. at 294 n.34.
89. Id. at 319 n.53.
90. Id. at 318.
91. Id. at 320, 319 n.53.
1. 28 Cal. 3d 494, 620 P.2d 587, 170 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1980).
2. Id. at 501, 620 P.2d at 592, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 6. See In re Williamson, 43 Cal.
2d 651, 654, 276 P.2d 593, 596 (1954). Reference was made to "the general rule that
where the general statute standing alone would include the same matter as the
special act, and thus conflict with it, the special act will be considered as an excep-
tion to the general statute whether it was passed before or after such general en-
actment."
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presented to the court in Jenkins was whether or not an individ-
ual who fraudulently obtains aid under the Aid for Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) in violation of section 114833 of the
California Welfare and Institutions Code may also be prosecuted
for perjury.
In Jenkins, the defendant was charged with one count of wel-
fare fraud and one count of perjury. She moved to dismiss the
second count on the ground that the Welfare and Institutions
Code was a specific statute that precluded the state from prose-
cuting her under the more general perjury statute in the Califor-
nia Penal Code. The court, while recognizing this general rule,
concluded that this general rule gave way to the "overwhelming
indications of a contrary legislative intent."'4 The third sentence
of section 11054 provides that "[alny person signing a statement
containing such declaration is subject to the penalty prescribed
for perjury in the Penal Code"5 if he or she willfully makes a false
statement. The court found that this phrasing explicitly autho-
rizes a prosecution for perjury under section 118 of the California
Penal Code, the general statute.
B. EDUCATION LAW
1. Back-pay under Education Code section 45025: Cali-
fornia Teachers Association v. San Diego Community Col-
lege District
The California Supreme Court in California Teachers Associa-
tion v. San Diego Community College District1 addressed the is-
sue of the proper method for determining pro-rata back-pay under
section 45025 of the Education Code of California.2
3. Section 11483 provides that,
Whenever any person has, by means of false statement of representation
or by impersonation or other fraudulent device, obtained aid for a child
not in fact entitled thereto, the person obtaining such aid shall be pun-
ished as follows .... "
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11483 (West 1980).
4. 28 Cal. 3d at 506, 620 P.2d at 584, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
5. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11054 (West 1980). The explicit function of this
language is to authorize a perjury prosecution under § 118 of the California Penal
Code. Moreover, the legislative purpose here is aimed specifically and exclusively
at AFDC applications. Section 11265 of the California Welfare and Institutions
Code also deals with AFDC benefits and obliges a family receiving AFDC to com-
plete a "certificate of eligibility" at each annual redetermination of eligibility.
Each adult member of the family is required to provide "under penalty of perjury"
the necessary information. CAL WEL. & INST. CODE § 11265 (West 1980).
1. 28 Cal. 3d 692, 621 P.2d 856, 170 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1981).
2. Section 45025 provides that:
In fixing the compensation of part-time employees, governing boards shall
provide an amount which bears the same ratio to the amount provided
full-time employees as the time actually served by such part-time employ-
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The plaintiffs in the present case sought a preemptive writ of
mandate ordering the defendant to reclassify certain part-time
teachers as regular employees, thereby entitling them to an in-
crease in pay and other benefits not received as part-time employ-
ees. After determining that the teachers involved should be
reclassified pursuant to Peralta Federation of Teachers v. Peralta
Community College District,3 the court turned its attention to sec-
tion 45025 in order to determine the appropriate method of calcu-
lating pro-rata pay for the affected teachers. In that section, the
question governing pay of part-time employees was the meaning
of the phrase "time actually served." A statement made by the
author of the statute, which he attributed to former Governor
Reagan, indicated that this phrase meant that pay should reflect
the time actually spend in the classroom, excluding time used for
other activities. The majority held that these statements were
merely the personal beliefs of an individual legislator and could
not adequately qualify as the legislative intent of this section.4 In
so holding, the court concluded that "time actually served" in-
cluded time spent for other duties undertaken outside the class-
room.
In her dissent, Chief Justice Bird notes that the legislature spe-
cifically replaced the former phrasing "time required" with the
present "time actually served," thereby concluding that the intent
was to compensate for classroom time only.5
C. SCOPE OF REVIEW
1. California Unemployment Insurance Code Section
ees bears to the time actually served by full-time employees of the same
grade of assignment.
CAI. EDUC. CODE § 45025 (West 1978).
3. 24 Cal. 3d 369, 595 P.2d 113, 155 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1979). The applicable section
of the Education Code does not apply to persons who were hired before its effec-
tive date, November 8, 1967. The situation here as "essentially the same" as in Pe-
ralta, and therefore, the court held that these professors should be reclassified
accordingly. See 28 Cal. 3d at 697, 621 P.2d at 858, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
4. 28 Cal. 3d at 699, 621 P.2d at 861, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
5. 28 Cal. 3d at 702, 621 P.2d at 861, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 822. The Chief Justice
focuses on the revenue-generating hours of determining compensation. She states
that the legislature's purpose was to eliminate "time required" because that stan-
dard included non-revenue-generating hours filled with risks such as: counseling
hours, supervising student activities, class preparation, etc. These activities could
easily fill the 30 hours required for full-time teachers, while none of them may ac-
tually by generating revenue for the state. Id. at 704, 621 P.2d at 867, 170 Cal. Rptr.
at 828.
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409.2: Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Unemployment
Insurance Appeals Board
Section 409.21 of the California Unemployment Insurance Code
authorizes an interested person or organization 2 to seek declara-
tory relief in order to overturn a decision of the Unemployment
Insurance Appeals Board. Prior to the California Supreme
Court's decision in Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Unem-
ployment Insurance Appeals Board,3 the proper level of review
for factual findings of an administrative ruling was that a trial
court could decide issues of fact de novo.4 The Pacific Legal
Foundation court held that the proper level of review for factual
findings in a section 409.2 action was whether the facts, as stated
in the board's decision, were supported by substantial evidence.5
This decision, however, is limited to situations where interested
1. Any interested person or organization may bring an action for declara-
tory relief in the Superior court in accordance with the provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure to obtain a judicial declaration as to the validity
of any precedent decision of the appeals board issue under Section 409 or
409.1
CAl. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 409.2 (West Supp. 1981).
2. An interested person has been defined as meaning "a person having a di-
rect, and not a merely consequential, interest in the litigation." Associated Bd. In-
dus. v. Marshall, 104 Cal. App. 2d 21, 22, 230 P.2d 379, 389 (1951).
Pacific Legal Foundation claimed to be an interested party because the Founda-
tion had 32 employees covered by unemployment insurance. Therefore, the Foun-
dation argued that it could be effected not only by having to pay increased
insurance rates but also by finding themselves directly effected as a party to a
benefit action where the precedent might have been followed. Pacific Legal Foun-
dation v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 74 Cal. App. 3d 150, 154-57, 141 Cal. Rptr.
474, 477-78 (1977).
3. 29 Cal. 3d 101, 624 P.2d 244, 172 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1981). Thurman Carroll, an
applicant for unemployment insurance benefits, had been denied benefits by the
Employment Development Department for failing to make a diligent job search
even though he had been unfamiliar with the job market and he had taken the ac-
tions duly prescribed by a Department employee. Although as administrative law
judge affirmed the benefit denial, the Unemployment Insurance Department for
failing to make a diligent job search even though he had been unfamiliar with the
job market and he had taken the actions duly prescribed by a Department em-
ployee. Although as administrative law judge affirmed the benefit denial, the Un-
employment Insurance Appeal Board reversed. Thereafter, Pacific Legal
Foundation sought declaratory relief to challenge the board's decision.
4. In deciding facts de novo, the trial court has great discretion to reweigh all
the evidence presented before the administrative board. See, e.g., Interstate
Brands v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 26 Cal. 3d 770, 608 P.2d 707, 163 Rptr.
619 (1980) (review of a Board's decision on finding of evidence allowed); Douglas
v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 63 Cal. App. 3d 110, 133 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1976)
(trial court did not err in making findings of fact different than those made by the
board); Agnone v. Hansen, 41 Cal. App. 3d 524, 116 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1974) (independ-
ent judgment of the evidence at an administrative hearing is exercised by the trial
court).
5. Substantial evidence, as applied to administrative review, "is the kind of
evidence that 'a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclu-
sion."' BLAcK's LAw DICIONARY 1281 (5th ed. 1979).
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nonparties 6 bring an action for declaratory relief to challenge a
particular decision merely for its precedential value.7
Thurman Carroll, a gardener and caretaker, was denied unem-
ployment insurance benefits for a two week period for failure to
make a diligent job search. On appeal, an administrative law
judge affirmed the ruling that Carroll was ineligible for benefits.
The Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, however, reversed
the previous holdings by finding Mr. Carroll eligible for unem-
ployment insurance benefits. Pacific Legal Foundation, a private,
nonprofit, public interest legal foundation, brought a declaratory
action under section 409.2 in an attempt to overturn this decision
of the appeals board.
The California Supreme Court in Pacific Legal Foundation de-
termined that since the Foundation's interest, as an interested
nonparty, was limited to the legal implications of the board ruling
as precedent, it would be improper for a trial court in a section
409.2 action to review the facts in a particular case unless such
facts were without substantial support.8 The court specifically
stated:
There should be no review of the underlying record or new evidence to
discover whether the board correctly resolved disputes on adjudicative
facts. The board's version of those facts may not be disturbed unless it
lacks substantial support on the fact of the decision. And whatever result
a court reaches on the merits, the declaratory judgment may not alter the
result between the parties.9
Accordingly, the Supreme Court determined that in a section
409.2 action a trial court may not disturb the administrative
board's findings of fact unless they are without substantial sup-
6. See note 2 supra.
7. Challenging an administrative decision for its precedential values occurs
when an interested nonparty seeks review of an administrative decision at the
trial court level. Normally a review of a prior decision is made by an original party
to the action. In this situation, the interested party is primarily interested in a
vindiction of his rights and obligations, while only secondarily interested in the
law used or developed at the hearing or litigation. However, in a section 409.2 ac-
tion, the interested nonparty seeking relief is only concerned with the preceden-
tial value of such decision. The interested nonparty has no personal rights or
obligations at stake in the outcome of the hearing or litigation therefore is ac-
corded the status of interested "nonparty."
8. The court in Pacific Legal Foundation reasoned that "because of the (un-
employment) agency's expertise, its view of a statute or regulation, it enforces is
entitled to great weight unless clearly erroneous or unauthorized." 29 Cal. 3d at
111, 624 P.2d at 248-49, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 198-99 (citing International Business Mach.
v. State Bd. of Equalization, 26 Cal. 3d 923, 930-31, 609 P.2d 1,5, 163 Cal. Rptr. 782,
786 (1980)).
9. 624 P.2d at 248, 172 CaL Rptr. at 198.
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port of the evidence. In short, unlike an original interested party,
an interested nonparty may not gain a de novo review of the facts
in a section 409.2 action10
Thus, the Pacific Legal Foundation decision makes it more dif-
ficult for an interested nonparty to gain reversal of prior deci-
sions.'" As a result, interested nonparties are less likely to seek
trial court reviews of administrative decisions involving complex
issues of fact because of the increased standard imposed on them
in section 409.2 actions.
III. ARBITRATION LAW
A. SELECTION OF THE ARBITRATOR
1. Non-neutrality Prohibited: Graham v. Scissor-Tail
Pursuant to the California Supreme Court case of Graham v. Scissor-
Tail, the developing body of arbitration law in California has experienced
another major adjustment. The previously held notion that parties to an
arbitration agreement were absolutely free to designate whomever they
wish as their arbitrator, was severely limited by this decision. The author
analyzes the majority's opinion, which prohibits the use of non-neutral ar-
bitrators, and calls attention to the significant body of law in California
which is necessarily overruled by Graham.
In a recent decision, the California Supreme Court has made a
significant adjustment to the law regarding arbitration in Califor-
nia. Specifically, in the area of contractual arbitration, the court
now requires that the agreed upon arbitrator must be an impar-
tial entity. This decision imposes further restrictions on contrac-
tual arbitration than those that had existed under section 1280 of
the California Arbitration Act.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, arbitration has become an important part of the
American judicial system. Very simply, arbitration' is a contrac-
10. The court stated that "[s]ection 409.2 recognizes that precedent decisions
are akin to agency rulemaking because they announce how governing law will be
applied to future cases .... Therefore, the statute gives persons affected by the
precedent judicial recourse similar to that available against regulations generally."
Id. at 109, 624 P.2d at 247, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
11. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
1. An initial distinction must be made between the type of arbitration dis-
cussed in this case and another which has recently become the focus of many
courts in California. The Graham decision discusses contractual arbitration, a
process through which the parties voluntarily agree to submit themselves to an
arbitration proceeding to resolve disputes that may arise under their contract. Ad-
dressing this contractual obligation, one author notes that "[wihile it may be and
usually is compulsory that the parties to arbitration respect and obey the award
that terminates the proceedings, it is not compulsory that the parties enter into an
arbitrational agreement." C. UPDEGRAFF & W. McCoy, ARBrrRATION OF LABOR Dis-
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tual device through which the parties agree to settle any subse-
quent contractual disputes out of court.2 One of the items which
may be agreed upon is the method of selection of the person who
will arbitrate a dispute. The California Arbitration Act3 expressly
provides that this arbitrator need not be entirely neutral. In perti-
nent part, it states that "[ijf the arbitration agreement provides a
method of appointing an arbitrator, such method shall be fol-
lowed." 4 Such statutory language indicates that the parties'
agreement shall govern the dispute resolution process. Section
1282 of the Act continues by noting that "[ujnless the arbitration
agreement otherwise provides,. . . arbitration shall be by a single
neutral arbitrator."5 Therefore, only in the absence of a contrac-
PUTEs 9 (2d ed. 1961). See also Robinson v. Bickley, 30 Pa. 384, 389 (1858). The
court defined arbitration as an agreement by the parties that the arbitrators shall
by award, define and settle their legal rights and duties in relation thereto, and
that the parties will obey the decision.
There is, however, another branch of arbitration that is not voluntary. In judi-
cial arbitration, the parties to disputes, who have not agreed to arbitrate, are re-
quired to do so by the court. Rule 1600 of the California Rules of Court governs
the procedure of judicial arbitration. It is much more formal than contractual arbi-
tration, being subject to the rules of evidence with minor exceptions. See CAL. R.
CT. 1613 (West Supp. 1981) (rule 1613 governs rules of evidence at arbitration hear-
ings).
As a point of clarification, however, it is important to note that the arbitration
referred to by both this article and the court in Graham is contractual in nature,
completely voluntary, and is quite separate and apart from judicial arbitration.
2. As initially conceived, arbitration was a process through which parties vol-
untarily referred their disputes to an impartial third party, designated as the arbi-
trator, for a final and binding decision. UPDEGRAFF, supra note 1 at 3-6. The object
was to obtain an inexpensive and speedy determination from "judges" selected by
the parties themselves. See, e.g., Gates v. Arizona Brewing Co., 54 Ariz. 266, 269, 95
P.2d 49, 50 (1939). In Gates, the plaintiff sought to sue the defendant for back
wages unpaid. Defendant's response was that the plaintiff had failed to state a
cause of action, the contention being that the contract provided for arbitration
before any suit could be brought in a court of law.
Certain studies indicate that arbitration requires less than one-fifth the hearing
time and one-fifth to one-half the preparation of a complete judicial proceeding.
See E. JOHNSON, V. KANTOR & E. SCHWARTZ, OUTSIDE THE COU-RTS: A SURVEY OF
DIVERSION ALTERNATIVES IN CIVIL CASES 40 (1977).
While there are several advantages to arbitration over litigation, see F. ELKouPi
& E. ELKouiu, How ARBrrRATION WORKS 7 (4th ed. 1970), many attorneys are un-
comfortable in its relaxed parameters. Because conventional rules of evidence are
ignored in this setting, otherwise skillful lawyers find themselves relying on other
skills that are seldom used. It has been noted that "lawyers do not like informal-
ity." See E. TEPLE & R. MOBERLY, ARBITRATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 526
(1979).
3. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-99 (West 1972).
4. CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE § 1281.6 (West 1972).
5. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 1282 (West 1972). Illustrating the extent to which
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tual provision to the contrary will a neutral arbitrator be required.
By inference,6 a logical interpretation of this statute would allow
the parties to an arbitration agreement to contract for someone
other than a neutral person or group of persons to arbitrate a dis-
pute. Such has been the law in California concerning arbitration.
The California Supreme Court recently made a significant ad-
justment to the aforementioned contractual autonomy that is pro-
vided for in the California Arbitration Act.7 In Graham v. Scissor-
Tail,8 the supreme court held that "'minimum levels of integrity,'
which are requisite to the contractual arrangement for the nonju-
dicial resolution of dispute are not achieved by an arrangement
which designates the union of one of the parties at the arbitrator
of disputes arising out of employment .... ,9 Such a decision
clearly places added restrictions on the contractual freedom of
choice of arbitrators available to parties under section 1282 of the
California Arbitration Act.
I1. FACTS
The dispute in Graham arose as a result of differing interpreta-
tions of Form B,10 a performance contract designed by the Ameri-
the arbitrator and the parties may be associated, the case of San Luis Obispo Bay
Properties, Inc. v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 28 Cal. App. 3d 556, 104 Cal. Rptr. 733
(1972), held that common membership in the same professional organization was
not enough to create a reasonable impression of possible bias so as to require the
arbitration award to be vacated. In Federico v. Frick, 3 Cal. App. 3d 872, 84 Cal.
Rptr. 74 (1970), the court held that it was the legislature's function to amend the
California Arbitration Act in light of the fact that arbitration is "entirely a creature
of statute." Id. at 875, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 76. In so finding, the court refused to hold
that contracts of adhesion were beyond the acts coverage. Id. at 876, 84 Cal. Rptr.
at 76.
As will be discussed later, however, an arbitration agreement will not be en-
forced if it suffers from basic contract fatalities, such as unconscionability. See
notes 39 & 41 infra and accompanying text.
6. The use of the conjunctive "unless" indicates that non-neutral arbitrators
would be permissible unless the parties failed to appoint one specifically.
7. This "contractual autonomy" principle within arbitration was recognized
by the Graham court in their opinion. Specifically, the court said that the "Cali-
fornia Arbitration Act ... contemplate[s] complete contractual autonomy in
choice of an arbitrator." 28 Cal. 3d 807, 821, 623 P.2d 165, 174, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604, 613.
8. 28 Cal. 3d 807, 623 P.2d 165, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604.
9. Id. at 827, 623 P.2d at 117, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 616. The term "minimum levels
of integrity" was initially coined by the United States Supreme Court in Hines v.
Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976). While no definition was given as to
what these minimum levels would be, the facts of that case fell below the Hines
Court's perception of them. In Hines, the union, who was also the arbitrator,
breached its duty to investigate false charges used as a basis for discharging cer-
tain employees. The Court held that in view of this breach on the union's part, the
employees were relieved of their duty to arbitrate the dispute. See notes 66-68 in-
fra and accompanying text.
10. Form B is a standard industry contract. One is prepared for each sched-
uled performance and each is identical in contents, except for the provisions re-
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can Federation of Musicians (A.F. of M.). The plaintiff, Bill
Graham, was an experienced promoter and producer of rock con-
certs. Defendant, Scissor-Tail, Inc., was a California corporation,
wholly owned by Leon Russell, a successful performer, recording
artist, and member of the A.F. of M. The contract, Form B, pro-
vided that any dispute arising out of its terms would be arbitrated
by the union."
Four concerts were scheduled by Mr. Russell and identical con-
tracts were prepared for each. All four contracts were signed by
Graham while only two of the contracts, those concerning Ontario
and Oakland appearances, were signed by the defendant Russell.
The Ontario concert took place as scheduled and resulted in a net
loss of $63,000.12 The Oakland concert followed, resulting in a net
profit of $98,000. The dispute arose over who was to bear the loss
sustained in the Ontario concert.13 Graham asserted that all
losses should be offset against the profits at the Oakland concert
while Scissor-Tail claimed that Graham should bear all losses
without offset.
Although aware of the arbitration clause contained in their con-
tracts, Graham filed an action for breach of contract when Russell
refused to execute the two consigned contracts and used another
promoter/producer for the two remaining concerts. Scissor-Tail
responded with a petition to compel arbitration.14 Arbitration
proceedings resulted in a decision awarding the full amount of
garding "hours of employment" and "wage agreed upon." 28 Cal. 3d at 812, 623
P.2d at 167, 168, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 606, 607.
11. Id. at 813, 623 P.2d at 168, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
Form B reads in part: the parties will submit every claim, dispute, contro-
versy or difference involving the musical services arising out of or con-
nected with this contract and the engagement covered thereby for
determination by the International Executive Board of the Federation...
and such determination shall be conclusive, final and binding upon the
parties.
12. Gross receipts were $173,000, while the expenses exceeded $236,000. Id. at
813, 623 P.2d at 168, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
13. Id. at 813, 623 P.2d at 168, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
14. "After once ordering arbitration, the trial court in 1974 granted reconsider-
ation in order to permit discovery 'limited to the issues of whether an agreement
to arbitrate was entered into and whether grounds exist to rescind such agree-
ment ...."' Id. at 814, 623 P.2d at 169, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 608. Section 1281.2 of the
California Arbitration Act provides:
On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of
a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto re-
fuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner
and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an
agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that:
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Scissor-Tail's claim against Graham.' 5 The decision was made in
spite of the fact that Graham presented evidence that under mu-
sic industry practices and customs, the promoter was "understood
to bear no risk of loss because his share of the profits under such
contracts was considerably smaller than under normal con-
tracts."16
Graham contended that the provision requiring arbitration was
unenforceable due to the fact that the arbitrator was a non-neu-
tral entity. 17 As such, Graham refused to honor the arbitrator's
decision. Scissor-Tail filed a petition in the superior court to con-
firm the award and force payment. Graham responded by fiing a
petition to vacate the arbitrator's award.18 The court, however, af-
firmed Scissor-Tail's award.' 9
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
The decision in Graham was rendered without dissent. The
supreme court's initial consideration was the validity of the order
(a) the right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or
(b) grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement ....
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2 (West 1979).
15. The award consisted of $53,000, representing 85% of the net receipts from
the Oakland concert less an advance made by Graham to Scissor-Tail prior to the
concert. Apparently Graham had retained the net proceeds of the Oakland con-
cert as an offset against the loss sustained in the Ontario concert. 28 Cal. 3d at 815
n.6, 623 P.2d at 169 n.6, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 608 n.6.
16. Id. at 815, 623 P.2d at 170, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 609. The "normal contract" re-
ferred to here, is one in which all the terms are negotiable between the parties.
Form B has several terms which are non-negotiable, most likely due to the need
for uniformity in the industry, and are thus not the product of normal contract-
forming procedures. See notes 29 & 30 infra.
17. Graham's argument is basically that the contract is unconscionable. See
note 37 infra and accompanying text.
18. 28 Cal. 3d at 816, 623 P.2d at 170, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 609. See CAL. Crv. PROC.
CODE § 1285 (West 1972) which reads in part: "Any party to an arbitration in
which an award has been made may petition the court to confirm, correct or va-
cate the award. The petition shall name as respondents all parties to the arbitra-
tion and may name as respondents any other persons bound by the arbitration
award."
19. 28 Cal. 3d at 816, 623 P.2d at 170, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 609. See CAL. Crv. PRoc.
CODE § 1287.4 (West 1972) which reads in part:
If any award is confirmed, judgment shall be entered in conformity there-
with. The judgment so entered has the same force and effect as, and is
subject to all the provisions of law relating to, a judgment in a civil action;
and it may be enforced like any other judgment of the court in which it is
entered.
In denying Graham's petition to vacate, the trial court noted that the contracts
which were executed by Graham, specifically contained a provision for arbitration.
The court also noted that the "arbitration provision clearly designated the Ameri-
can Federation of Musicians as the Arbitrator. Therefore, any appearance of bias,
nonneutrality, or lack of impartiality of the arbitrator was known to the plaintiff,
Bill Graham, at the time of the execution of the agreement containing a provision
for arbitration." 28 Cal. 3d at 816 n.8, 623 P.2d at 170 n.8, 171 Cal. Rptr at 609 n.8.
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compelling arbitration.20 Graham's primary contention was that
the underlying agreement concerning arbitration was an unen-
forceable contract of adhesion. 21 The court's analysis of this con-
tention was divided into two issues: whether or not the contract
was one of adhesion; and if so, whether or not it was enforceable.
The court began its analysis of the first issue by citing Neal v.
State Farm Insurance Co. ,22 wherein the California Court of Ap-
peal defined the term "contract of adhesion" as a "standardized
contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bar-
gaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the op-
portunity to adhere to the contract or reject it."23 Applying the
Neal analysis, the Graham court examined the bargaining power
of the respective parties. While noting the apparent strength of
Graham's position, due to his "prominence and success in the
promotion of popular music concerts, '24 the court was more im-
pressed by the "realities" of the music industry. Apparently, all
concert artists and groups of any significance belonged to the A.F.
of M.25 Consequently, as members of the union, they were not
permitted to sign any form of contract other than that issued by
the union.26 As a result of these restrictions, any musical pro-
moter or producer contracting for the services of an A.F. of M.
member was reduced to the "humble role of an adherent."27
Under the circumstances of this case, anyone wishing to promote
a Leon Russell concert was presented with the non-negotiable op-
tion of either signing Form B or not conducting the promotion at
20. Normally, the plaintiff is not allowed to seek review of an order compelling
arbitration. However, the plaintiff is entitled to have the validity of this order re-
viewed on appeal from the judgment of confirmation. See La Pietra v. Freed, 87
Cal. App. 3d 1025, 1031, 151 Cal. Rptr. 554, 557 (1978); Atlas Plastering, Inc. v. Supe-
rior Court, 72 Cal. App. 3d 63, 67-68, 140 Cal. Rptr. 59, 63-64 (1977); Wheeler v. St.
Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 353, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 784 (1976); Maddy v. Cas-
tle, 58 Cal. App. 3d 716, 719-20, 130 Cal. Rptr. 160, 163-66 (1976).
21. 28 Cal. 3d at 817, 623 P.2d at 170, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
22. 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 10 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1961).
23. Id. at 694, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 784. See generally, Kessler, Contracts of Adhe-
sion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L REV. 629, 640-42
(1943). For a discussion of contracts of adhesion and their treatment in California,
see Sybert, Adhesion Theory in California: A Suggested Redefinition And Its Ap-
plication to Banking, 11 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 297, 301-05 (1978).
24. 28 Cal. 3d at 818, 623 P.2d at 171, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
25. Id., 623 P.2d at 172, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
26. Id. The effect of such a restriction is obvious. According to the definition
in the Neal case, it becomes apparent that Graham must either sign Form B as
presented to him by the union, or not do business with Mr. Russell at all.
27. Id., 623 P.2d at 171, 172, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 610, 611.
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all. The Graham court viewed this as a situation which fell within
the confines of the definition of adhesion given in the Neal case.28
Scissor-Tail had argued that many other terms in Form B, such
as "length, time, and date of concert,"29 were entirely open to ne-
gotiation. The court, however, held that the presence of other al-
legedly negotiable terms could not remove the taint of adhesion,30
and concluded that the contract could be "fairly described as ad-
hesive."3 1 The California Supreme Court had previously identi-
fied three factors which are commonly found in contracts of
adhesion. In Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,32 a group
medical plan was found not to be adhesive after the court ana-
lyzed the plan in light of these three factors. They were enumer-
ated as follows:
(1) [TIhe stronger party drafts the contract, and the weaker [party] has
no opportunity ... to negotiate concerning its terms ....
(2) In many cases of adhesion contracts, the weaker party lacks ...any
realistic opportunity to look elsewhere for a more favorable contract; he
must either adhere to the standardized agreement or forgo the needed
service ....
(3) Finally, in all prior contract of adhesion cases, the courts have con-
cerned themselves with weighted contractual provisions which served to
limit the obligations or liability of the stronger party.
3 3
The situation between Graham and Russell satisfied the ele-
ments of this test. The rigid requirement of adherence to Form B,
enclosed by the union, precluded any negotiations concerning the
agreement to arbitrate. Yet any performer worth promoting be-
longed to the union and was thereby obligated to use Form B. Es-
28. The definition in Neal describes a situation wherein one of the parties to a
contract is forced to accept certain terms without the option of negotiations or be
forced to completely refrain from doing business with the other person or group of
persons. 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 695, 10 Cal. Rptr. 781, 784 (1961). The contract was
described by appellant as a "take-it-or-leave-it proposition," which the Neal court
noted typifies a contract of adhesion. Id. Such was the case in Graham. If Gra-
ham wished to promote rock concerts, he had to sign Form B.
29. 28 Cal. 3d at 819, 623 P.2d at 172, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 611. The court felt that
the terms asserted were of relatively minor significance in comparison to those im-
posed by Scissor-Tail, which included not only a provision concerning the manner
and rate of compensation, but also a provision dictating a union forum for the res-
olution of any dispute.
30. Id. Basically, the court is saying that a few positive points (negotiable
terms) cannot justify the unacceptable points of the contract.
31. In light of the Neal case, it appears as though there is a sound and ade-
quate basis for this conclusion. Graham has no other option but to comply with
Form B if he is to pursue his livelihood.
The court's description does not necessarily taint the entire contract. However,
the portion of this contract that was found to be adhesive was the section that con-
cerned whether or not the dispute would be arbitrated. Essentially, this is the ba-
sis of the entire agreement. If this portion is found to be unenforceable, the entire
matter will have to be litigated to determine whether or not the remainder of the
contract is enforceable.
32. 17 Cal. 3d 699, 552 P.2d 1178, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1976).
33. Id. at 711, 552 P.2d at 1185-86, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 889-90.
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sentially, this situation forced Graham to either perform his
service in accordance with Form B or not at all. Finally, the abil-
ity of the members of the A.F. of M. to control their contractual
obligations by means of a union arbitration panel seemed to sat-
isfy the third element. The essence of the court's concern ap-
peared to be a reluctance to allow one party to benefit from
another who had little or no ability to obtain a reciprocal benefit.
The second stage of the court's analysis involved an inquiry
into whether or not the Form B arbitration clause, as an adhesion
contract was enforceable. 34 In other words, the court did not be-
lieve adhesion alone would invalidate the contract. Referring to
the determination of the enforceability of a contract, the court
reasoned that "[i] t is, rather, the beginning and not the end of the
analysis insofar as enforceability of its terms is concerned." 35 Es-
sentially, a contract of adhesion may be fully enforceable accord-
ing to its terms, unless other factors are present which "operate
to render it otherwise." 36
The court indicated that a two factor test is applied to deter-
mine whether or not a contract of adhesion is unenforceable. The
first factor of the test examines whether or not an adhesion con-
tract falls within the expectations of the weaker or "adhering"
party; if it does not, it will not be enforced against him. The sec-
ond factor of the test consists of the doctrine of unconscionability,
which is "a principle of equity applicable to all contracts gener-
34. 28 Cal. 3d at 819, 820, 623 P.2d at 172, 173, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 611, 612.
35. Id. at 819, 623 P.2d at 172, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 611. (citing Wheeler v. St. Jo-
seph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 357, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 788 (1976)). The court here
is explaining the two-step analysis that must be conducted when determining the
validity of a contract that has been labeled "adhesive." In every case, there must
be a finding of adhesion plus some other factor which would render the contract
unenforceable. Several cases illustrate this point. In Meyers v. Guarantee Say. &
Loan Assn., 79 Cal. App. 3d 307, 144 Cal. Rptr. 616 (1978), the court found that all
ambiguities in an adhesive contract would be construed against the drafter. Id. at
311 n.1, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 619 n.1. Absent any ambiguity, however, the contract
would be enforced according to its terms. Id. at 312, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 619. Yeng
Sue Chow v. Levi Strauss & Co., 49 Cal. App. 3d 315, 122 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1975), held
that absent any ambiguity, contracts of adhesion are not unlike any other contract
in regard to their validity and enforceability.
36. 28 Cal. 3d at 819, 820, 623 P.2d at 172, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 611. Several Califor-
nia cases serve as examples. In Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 270-71, 419
P.2d 168, 172, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 108 (1966), and Employers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Foust, 29
Cal. App. 3d 382, 386, 105 Cal. Rptr. 505, 508 (1972), the courts found that an addi-
tional factor of the adhering party not receiving his "reasonable expectations"
would be fatal to the contract's validity.
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ally."37
Accordingly, the court applied the first of these factors to the
facts of Graham. "By [Graham's] own declarations and testi-
mony, he had been a party to literally thousands of A.F. of M. con-
tracts containing a similar provision . *... 38 Further testimony
had revealed that several of these contracts had been with Scis-
sor-Tail; each contract had contained arbitration provisions simi-
lar to those actually at issue.39 Additionally, Graham had been
involved with prior arbitration proceedings with the A.F. of M.,
and was familiar with disputes similar to his dispute with Scissor-
Tail. Graham's past experience with contracts containing arbitra-
tion agreements would seem to preclude any possibilitly of his
reasonable expectations being unsatisfied. Having dealt specifi-
cally with the A.F. of M. on prior occasions, Graham was familiar
with the union's Form B and should have reasonably expected
that arbitration would be required pursuant to the agreement.
The supreme court decided that, "it must be concluded that the
provisions requiring such arbitration ... were wholly consistent
with Graham's reasonable expectations upon entering into the
contract."40 Regarding this first factor, the court's conclusion ap-
pears to be based on an accurate analysis of the facts stipulated.
The second factor, the doctrine of unconscionability, upon
which the court based its decision, provided the vehicle for depar-
ture from previously recognized principles concerning contractual
arbitration in California. 41 The issue was framed narrowly by the
court: "whether the contract provision requiring arbitration before
the A.F. of M. -because it designates an arbitrator who, by reason
of its status and identity, is presumptively biased in favor of one
37. 28 Cal. 3d at 820, 623 P.2d at 173, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 612. As demonstrated in
Jacklich v. Baer, 57 Cal. App. 2d 684, 135 P.2d 179 (1943), "[e]quity will not lend its
aid to enforce contracts which upon their face are so manifestly harsh and oppres-
sive as to shock the conscience; it must be affirmatively shown that such contracts
are fair and just." Id. at 693, 135 P.2d at 183.
38. 28 Cal. 3d at 821, 623 P.2d at 173, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 612. See note 23 supra
and accompanying text.
39. Id. at 821, 623 P.2d at 173, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 612. The facts also reveal that
following the Oakland concert, Graham indicated that he, himself, would ifile
charges with the A.F. of M. (the arbitrator) if the matter was not settled to his sat-
isfaction. Id. at 814, 623 P.2d at 168-69, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 607-08.
40. Id. at 827, 623 P.2d at 173, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 612. While it is quite obvious
that certainly not all of Graham's expectations were met, in particular those deal-
ing with offsetting losses, it is clear that Graham was aware of the arbitration
agreement and that he reasonably knew what to reasonably expect. See note 39
supra and accompanying text.
The court seems to espouse an estoppel doctrine by holding that since Graham
knew of the arbitration agreement and did not challenge it until an undesirable
word was entered, he could not subsequently challenge the agreement on the
grounds that it did not meet his reasonable expectations.
41. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
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party-is for that reason to be deemed unconscionable and unen-
forceable."4 2
Following a brief look at the applicable sections in the Califor-
nia Arbitration Act, the court recognized that the statutory lan-
guage allows for the use of non-neutral arbitrators when agreed
upon by the parties. 43 In Federico v. Frick4 the Act was inter-
preted as "expressly permit[ting] the parties to an arbitration to
agree to the conduct of the proceedings by a non-neutral arbitra-
tor."45 The justices of the California Supreme Court continued by
noting that this should be the result even though "[ellementary
fairness may seem to demand that arbitration proceedings be
under the control of a neutral and impartial arbitrator."46
42. 28 Cal. 3d at 821, 623 P.2d at 173, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 612 (emphasis in original).
To frame the issue of unconscionability in this fashion is peculiar in light of the
fact that California statutory law allowed the parties to an arbitration agreement
to agree to have a non-neutral arbitrator hear their disputes. See note 5 supra and
accompanying text.
The same facts lend themselves to a variety of ways in which the issue could
have been framed. Basically, the issue is whether or not parties to an arbitration
agreement may decide on a non-neutral arbitrator. As has been shown, the re-
sponse to this issue should be in the affirmative. It appears as though the court
was merely framing an issue that would accommodate their preconceived conclu-
sion.
43. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 1282 (West 1979). See note 5 supra and accompa-
nying text.
44. 3 Cal. App. 3d 872, 84 Cal. Rptr. 74 (1970). Federico involved a one-year em-
ployment contract which provided for arbitration under the rules of the employees
union. The court interpreted the California Arbitration Act as being completely
autonomous. Indeed, the court said that since "arbitration [is] a creature of stat-
ute, the statute controls." 3 Cal. App. 3d at 876, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 76. Federico is
probably the most relevant of all the cases cited due to its similarity in facts. The
contract there, as in Graham, was found to be adhesive. The arbitrator in both
cases was the union of one of the parties. Yet, the California Supreme Court
chose to ignore the similarities and rule contrary to Federico.
It is somewhat unclear why the supreme court employed Federico at all. The
portion of Federico cited in Graham, see note 45 infra, weighs heavily against the
ultimate decision in Graham, and no attempt was made to distinguish the two. Fe-
derico merely served as additional authority that California case law did not sup-
port the court's decision.
45. 28 Cal. 3d at 822, 623 P.2d at 174, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 613, (citing 3 Cal. App. 3d
at 876, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 76).46. Id. This effectively illustrates the fundamental difference between arbitra-
tion and conventional judicial proceedings. Arbitration is not governed by the
usual rules of evidence or the strict procedural guidelines as are court proceed-
ings. See note 2 supra and accompanying text. Accordingly, certain fundamental
principles which are accepted in the field of courtroom procedure are virtually ig-
nored in arbitration. This produces a certain amount of frustration in the attorney
and parties who are accustomed to formalistic judicial proceedings. This frustra-
tion is illustrated by one author who notes that
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The application of Federico to the situation in Graham is some-
what troublesome in light of Federico's holding.47 While the Gra-
ham court recognized Federico's interpretation of section 1282 of
the California Arbitration Act as correct, the court proceeded to
formulate a holding clearly inconsistent with Federico, and was
unable to offer any support for its holding from the large body of
California case law on arbitration. The opinion continued with an
acknowledgement of the fact that California courts had consist-
ently reached the same conclusion as that reached in Federico.48
In particular, a series of cases involving the New York Stock Ex-
change addressed the same issue. In Arrieta v. Paine, Webber,
Jackson & Curtis, Inc. ,49 the court of appeal citing Federico,
stated that "[p] otential unfairness from the non-neutral nature of
an arbitrator is not a ground for vacation of the arbitration
award."5 0
Another case which involved the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) was Richards v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc.51 While the facts of Richards are distinguishable from those
[w]e are uncomfortable when we hear hearsay testimony. One of my
partners, trying a case in a usual forum, had a very technical lawyer on
the other side who kept interposing objections, primarily that the witness
was testifying to hearsay. After several objections, the witness said, 'That
ain't hearsay, that's I say!" and the objection was overruled.
See E. TEPLE & R. MOBERLY, ARBITRATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 526 (1979).
Another possible source of frustration is the distinction that serves as the focus
of the dispute in Graham. While the California Arbitration Act allows the use of a
non-neutral arbitrator, see note 5 supra and accompanying text, the California
Code of Civil Procedure states that "[w]hen it is made to appear probable that, by
reason of bias or prejudice ... a fair and impartial trial cannot be had before
him," such judge will be disqualified. CAL. Cry. PROC. CODE § 170(5) (West 1972).
See generally E. JOHNSON, V. KANTOR & E. SCHWARTZ, OUTSIDE THE COURTS: A
SuRvEY OF DIVERSION ALTERNATIVES IN CIvIL CASES 55 (1977).
47. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
48. Following an examination of several California cases, 28 Cal. 3d at 822-23,
623 P.2d at 174, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 613, the court decided that there was "a host of
cases from other jurisdictions which bear upon the problem." Id. at 823, 623 P.2d
at 175, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 614. The obvious dissatisfaction with California case law on
this point evidences a preconception on the court's part to decide against not only
the arbitration agreement, but also an inability to substantiate that preconception
with support from its own jurisdiction.
49. 59 Cal. App. 3d 322, 130 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1976).
50. Id. at 330, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 538.
51. 64 Cal. App. 3d 899, 135 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1976). See note 54 infra and accompa-
nying text. There are similarities between Richards and Graham. In both cases,
arbitration was to be conducted pursuant to the rules and under the authority of a
professional organization in which one of the parties was a member. Such was
also the case in both Federico and Arrieta. These facts alone were not found to
invalidate the arbitration agreement in any of these cases. However, in Richards,
the similarities with Graham cease. A comparison of the agreement in the two
cases reveals the pivotal fact that rendered the Richards agreement unenforce-
able. The unbridled authority vested in the New York Stock Exchange proved to
be the accompanying factor that made this adhesive contract unconscionable.
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in Graham, the court chose to employ the Richards rationale to
Graham.52 In Richards, a customer of the defendant filed an ac-
tion for breach of contract involving an alleged breach of a margin
agreement. The defendants sought to compel arbitration as pro-
vided for in the agreement. The agreement referred to the Consti-
tution and Rules of the Board of Governors of the NYSE and
provided that the Board of Governors "may from time to time
amend, alter or repeal any of the Rules of the Board with respect
to arbitration, either generally or in reference to a particular case,
as in its sole discretion may find expedient. '5 3 The court focused
particularly on language in Richards that stated that it was a "ba-
sic apparent unfairness in requiring the nonmember to submit to
arbitrators, all of whom have been appointed by the Exchange of
which Merrill Lynch is a member."5 4 However, the Richards
court made it very clear in its decision that it was this "factor in
combination with others which required the result reached."55
Apparently not satisfied with the case law of California to sup-
52. The rationale in Richards was that the combination of factors present in
that case would make enforcement unconscionable. See note 54 infra and accom-
panying text.
53. 64 Cal. App. 3d at 901-02, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 27. The problem with this ar-
rangement is two-fold: 1) the parties agree to let one of the parties unilaterally
control the arbitration proceeding; and 2) any specific provisions or procedure
agreed upon are also subject to one party's changes and adjustments. Essentially,
the parties are agreeing not to agree. Under such an arrangement the power ap-
pointed to one of the parties would be deemed as being "unconscionable." See
note 51 supra and accompanying text.
The unconscionability of this contract is much clearer than the unconscionabil-
ity alleged to be present in Graham. The unconscionability of the Richards con-
tract is the likelihood of the nonunion party being deprived of his reasonable
expectations. Indeed, the Richards rationale would have been more appropriate
under the first portion of the analysis in Graham concerning the enforceability of
a contract of adhesion.
54. 64 Cal. App. at 903, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 28. As mentioned earlier, this factor
alone was insufficient to invalidate the arbitration agreement. See note 51 supra.
The combination of both the adhesive nature of the contract and the authority to
unilaterally change the agreement at any time was intolerable to the Richards
court. While the first factor of adhesion was found in Graham, the latter was not.
In fact, the second factor that was combined with the adhesion concept to overrule
the arbitration agreement in Graham appears to have been the same factor that
rendered the contract one of adhesion initially; i.e., the arbitrator was the union of
one of the parties. See note 28 supra and accompanying text. The contract in Gra-
ham was labeled one of adhesion after the court decided that Graham had no op-
tion but to submit himself to A.F. of M. arbitrators.
55. 28 Cal. 3d at 823, 623 P.2d at 175, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 614. The court is correct
in its analysis that the partiality of the arbitrator in combination with the fact that
unbridled authority was placed in the New York Stock Exchange, allowing it to al-
ter its rules concerning arbitration at will, produced the fatal defect. However,
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port their desired objective, the supreme court looked to other ju-
risdictions for assistance.5 6 The most significant case outside of
California was a New York case, In re Cross & Brown,57 which
closely parallelled the facts in Graham. Cross & Brown involved
disputes over real estate brokerage claims which were handled
under an employment contract providing for arbitration. The con-
tract named the board of directors of the employer as the arbitrat-
ing body. The New York court determined that such an
arrangement would violate a "well-recognized principle of 'natural
justice' [that being] a man may not be a judge in his own
cause."58 Even the New York court, however, realized that while
these well-recognized principles are normally adhered to
[a]s a general rule, since arbitration is a contractual method of settling
disputes, whom the parties choose to act as an arbitrator is a matter of
their own judgment. An interest in the dispute or a relationship with a
party, if known to the parties to the agreement when the arbitrator is cho-
sen, will not disqualify the arbitrator from acting.59
The New York Supreme Court in Lipschutz v. Gutwirth,60 cited
Cross & Brown for the proposition that while contractual auton-
omy should be the paramount consideration when dealing with
arbitration agreements, "someone so identified with the party as
to be in fact, even though not in name, the party" cannot be desig-
nated as the arbitrator.61 The New York court held that such an
arrangement would be illusory, at best, by allowing an interested
party to decide disputes under the contract.62 While Lipschutz
and Cross & Brown provide a strong basis for the California
Supreme Court's eventual decision, their holdings had not previ-
ously been recognized in California. 63 To the contrary, California
courts had uniformly decided in favor of the explicit contractual
terms under these circumstances.64
such was not the case in the Graham situation. See note 59 infra and accompany-
ing text.
56. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
57. 4 A.D.2d 501, 167 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1957).
58. Id. at 502, 167 N.Y.S.2d at 573. As has been shown, many "well-recognized"
principles that are applicable in the judicial systems, are not recognized in arbitra-
tion. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
59. 4 A.D.2d at 502, 167 N.Y.S.2d at 576. Such relationship was known to the
parties in Graham. Non-neutrality will not serve as a basis for overruling an arbi-
trator's award on appeal. In Federico, the court specifically stated that evidence of
an arbitrator's bias will not suffice as a "statutory ground for either vacation of the
arbitrator's award or dismissal of the confirmation proceedings." 3 Cal. App. 3d at
876, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
60. 304 N.Y. 58, 106 N.E.2d 8 (1952).
61. 4 A.D.2d at 503, 167 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
62. 28 Cal. 3d at 824, 623 P.2d at 175, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 614. (citing 4 A.D.2d at 503,
167 N.Y.S.2d at 576).
63. Due to their jurisdictional setting, Lipschutz and Cross & Broum are per-
suasive authority at best.
64., See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
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In its continued search for authority for the additional factor cf
unconscionability, the California Supreme Court next turned its
attention to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hines
v. Anchor Motor Freight.65 The Hines case established a strong
policy favoring arbitration. The Court there stated that "Congress
has put its blessing on private settlement arrangements ... ,but
it was anticipated, we are sure, that the contractual machinery
would operate within some minimum levels of integrity."66
Such broad language as "minimum levels of integrity" lends it-
self to liberal interpretation. The California Supreme Court com-
bined the holdings of Lipschutz and Cross & Brown with the
broad language from Hines and took a somewhat unprecedented
step away from the policy of the contractual autonomy of arbitra-
tion agreements.67 From the Hines decision, the court noted its
role in determining what the "minimum levels of integrity"
should be.68 Exercising its role, the court reasoned that the arbi-
tration agreement between Graham and Scissor-Tail fell below
these minimum levels of integrity. The arbitrating body in Gra-
ham was described as being incapable of impartially deciding69
the dispute between the parties due to the close relationship be-
65. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
66. Id. at 571. The Supreme Court implies that the party's power to design
their own arbitration proceeding is not absolute. While these "minimum levels"
are never defined, see note 9 supra, it could not be reasonably assumed that the
arbitration proceedings in Graham would fall below them. This would seem the
proper conclusion since everything that occurred in Graham falls within the statu-
tory language of the California Arbitration Act, see notes 3-7 supra and accompa-
nying text.
67. In view of the Federico, Arrieta, and Richards cases, a decision prohibiting
the parties to an arbitration agreement from appointing a non-neutral arbitrator is,
indeed, a departure from former California case law.
68. 28 Cal. 3d at 825, 623 P.2d at 176, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
69. Id. at 825, 623 P.2d at 176, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 615. The California Supreme
Court defines the word "tribunal" (in the context of arbitration) as an "entity or
body which 'hears and decides disputes."' Id. The court applied the reasoning in
Cross & Brown to find that the A.F. of M. is "incapable of 'deciding' on the basis of
what it has 'heard.'" Id. This conclusion is reached undoubtedly due to the
court's belief that bias on the arbitrator's part would preclude him from having the
"impartiality necessary to act in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity regarding that
controversy." 4 A.D.2d at 506, 167 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
This decision was made in Cross & Brown only after the court decided that the
relationship betwen the arbitrator and the party was unknown to the opposition.
Id. at 503, 167 N.Y.S.2d at 575. The court indicated that normally it will not con-
sider the propriety of an agreement appointing the party's union as the arbitrator.
This is because the individual or entity chosen by the parties "to act as an arbitra-
tor is a matter of their own judgment." Id. However, in the case where the parties
are not aware of the non-neutrality, the court will look to see whether the decision
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tween Scissor-Tail and the arbitrator. The California Supreme
Court concluded that the agreement, under the circumstances of
this case, became, not a contract to arbitrate, "but an engagement
to capitulate. 70
This conclusion was reached despite the fact that past practices
and prior cases would dictate an opposite holding.71 The real diffi-
culty with the Graham case is that the court appears to be over-
ruling a substantial body of law without ever expressly doing so. 7 2
This is accompanied by the attempt to deliberately ignore statu-
tory law in California.73 No reasons were ever formulated for the
sudden change. Indeed, the court's motives, whatever they were,
seemed to be unlike those that compelled it to decide otherwise
on previous occasions.
IV. IMPACT
Although the decision in Graham v. Scissor-Tail is somewhat
limited to its factual confines, 74 its impact is anticipated to be sig-
nificant nonetheless. Essentially, the holding in Graham is that a
contractual provision designating the union of one of the parties
to the contract as the arbitrator of all disputes arising under the
contract, does not achieve the "minimum levels of integrity"
which are demanded of contractual substitutes for judicial pro-
ceedings by the United States Supreme Court in the Hines case.7 5
A combination of the adhesive nature of the contract and the as-
sumed partiality of the arbitrator provided the basis for this deci-
sion.
Although not expressly, the California Supreme Court in Gra-
rendered was impartial. Had the court found that the arbitrator was indeed neu-
tral, their decision would have likely been in favor of the arbitrator's decision.
In Graham, the court was not faced with the situation in Cross & Brown. Both
parties were aware of the arrangement and the position held by the arbitrator. It
seems that under these circumstances, the court need not arrive at a decision re-
garding the arbitrator's neutrality.
70. Id. at 502, 167 N.Y.S.2d at 576. The arrangement in Cross & Brown forced
the plaintiff to surrender its bargaining power.
71. Several California cases illustrate these past practices. In Forrest v. Hotel
Conquistador, Inc., 193 Cal. App. 2d 503, 14 Cal. Rptr. 349 (1961), the court reaf-
firmed its policy of favoring arbitration and allowing the parties to designate the
nature of any arbitration proceeding according to their intent. Several California
cases involving the New York Stock Exchange allowed for the use of a union arbi-
trator. See, e.g., Berman v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc., 44 Cal. App. 3d 999, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 130 (1975); Vernon v. Drexel Burnham & Co., 52 Cal. App. 3d 706, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 147 (1975); Lewsadder v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 36 Cal. App. 3d
255, 111 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1973); Frame v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
20 Cal. App. 3d 668, 97 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1971).
72. See note 76 infra and accompanying text.
73. See notes 3-5 supra and accompanying text.
74. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
75. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
1170
[Vol. 8: 1111, 1981] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
ham has effectively overruled a body of California case law and
has made significant adjustments to the California Arbitration
Act.76 The difficulty with this action is the fact that the court's
reasoning is inconsistent with statutory law.7 7 The court com-
bined the doctrines of adhesion and unconscionability to invali-
date the agreement. However, the unconscionable element, the
possible bias of an appointed arbitrator, was an arrangement ex-
pressly permitted under state law.7 8 In essence, this decision
does violence to section 1282 of the California Arbitration Act
which has always allowed contracting parties to agree on the use
of a non-neutral arbitrator of their choice. 79
A presence of either adhesion or a non-neutral arbitrator would
not, alone, have been sufficient grounds to invalidate an agree-
ment.8 0 It is difficult to see how these elements, when combined,
make a contract any less enforceable, in light of the fact that
76. Without exception, the California cases employed by the supreme court in
its decision oppose the Graham holding. Such cases include Federico, Arrieta,
and Richards. The most notable of these is the Richards case. The California
Supreme Court relied heavily on this case and reached a similar decision. How-
ever, the main objection to the court in Richards was that the rules governing ar-
bitration, including the appointment of the arbitrator, could be changed at any
time and in reference to any particular case. 64 Cal. App. 3d at 903, 135 Cal. Rptr.
at 28. The Richards court noted that the "code of Civil Procedure provides for the
parties to agree upon an arbitrator and if the 'agreed method fails,' for the court to
appoint one." Id. at 903 n.2, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 28 n.2. In Graham, the parties did
agree to the arbitrator and that decision could not, thereafter, be altered by either
party. The fact that this arbitrator was partial would not, alone, be fatal under the
Richards case or any other California case cited.
Although present in Richards, the provision which allowed one of the parties to
unilaterally decide on the arbitrator by changing the governing rules at the last
moment was not present in Graham. In Graham, the decision to allow the A.F. of
M. to arbitrate the dispute was made bilaterally; both parties were bound by that
decision.
In light of the foregoing, the use of Richards as a precedent to the judicial action
taken in Graham becomes problematic. Indeed, instead of following the reasoning
in Richards, the supreme court, in effect, overruled it.
The section of the California Arbitration Act which are specifically affected are
§§ 1281.6, 1282. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1281.6, 1282 (West 1972). See notes 4-5
supra and accompanying text.
77. See notes 3-5 supra and accompanying text.
78. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 1282 (West 1972).
79. In Federico v. Frick, 3 Cal. App. 3d 872, 84 Cal. Rptr. 74 (1970), the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal held that while "[eIlementary fairness may seem to demand
that arbitration proceedings be under the control of a neutral and impartial arbi-
trator ... section 1282 of the Act expressly permits the parties to an arbitration to
agree to the conduct of arbitration proceedings by a nonneutral arbitrator." Id. at
876, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
80. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
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these elements are permissible under state law. The effect of
Graham v. Scissor-Tail will undoubtedly be a reduction in the
contractual autonomy available when entering into arbitration
agreements.
V. CONCLUSION
The conclusion that will be reached by the various courts who
interpret this decision is unpredictable. This is due to the fact
that the Graham decision failed to clarify what factual settings
would be effected by its holding. As with anysudden departure
from precedent, the period of adjustment will undoubtedly expe-
rience some difficulties. What is clear, however, is that parties en-
tering into an agreement that provides for arbitration are no
longer afforded all of the freedoms previously available under the
California Arbitration Act.
IV. REAL PROPERTY
A. LANDLORD AND TENANT
1. Implied Covenant of Habitability: Knight v. Halistham-
mar
I. INTRODUCTION
For almost a decade, California has recognized the existence of
an implied warranty of habitability in residential property. In
1972, Hinson v. Delis' established that California would follow the
lead of other jurisdictions in adopting this doctrine. 2 However,
until Knight v. Hallsthammar,3 California courts held that
breaches of the implied warranty of habitability on residential
1. 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972) (upon careful consideration of
cases in other jurisdictions, the court adopted the common law implied warranty
of habitability). For a further discussion of the implied warranty of habitability
see generally Heskin, The Warranty of Habitability Debate: A California Case
Study, 66 CAIrF. L. REV. 37 (1978); Moskovitz, The Implied Warranty of Habitabil-
ity. A New Doctrine Raising New Issues, 62 CALIF. L REV. 1444 (1974); Meyers, The
Covenant of Habitability and the American Law Institute, 27 STAN. L REV. 879
(1975); Note, The Great Green Hope: The Implied Warranty of Habitability in
Practice, 28 STAN L. REV. 729 (1976); Note, Green v. Superior Court: A New Rem-
edyfor the California Tenant, 5 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 145 (1974).
2. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 68-70, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 665-66.
3. 29 Cal. 3d 46, 623 P.2d 268, 171 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1981). A group of tenants liv-
ing in housing having numerous health violations informed their new landlord
that rent would be withheld after being informed themselves that rent was being
raised. In an action by the new landlord for unlawful detainer, the tenants at-
tempted to defend their actions by stating that the housing violations were a
breach of implied warranty of habitability, justifying their withholding rent. The
majority opinion was written by Chief Justice Bird, with Justices Tobriner, Mosk,
Richardson, and Newman concurring. Justice Clark was the sole dissenter.
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property could be waived under certain circumstances. 4 The
Knight decision represents a significant extension of the protec-
tions afforded the tenant in Green v. Superior Court5 by permit-
ting a tenant to withhold rent and defend an unlawful detainer
action, even when the tenant takes possession with prior knowl-
edge of such defects. Additionally, Knight expressly held that the
remedy of withholding rent for a breach of the warranty could be
accomplished even before allowing a landlord a reasonable time
to repair,6 even if that landlord was not himself responsible for
such breach.7
II. THE COURT'S DECISION
In Knight v. Hallsthammar, the California Supreme Court de-
termined that a tenant's knowledge of defects prior to occupancy
does not serve as a waiver of the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity.8 The court stated:
The same reasons which imply the existence of the warranty of habitabil-
ity-the inequality of bargaining power, the shortage of housing, and the
impracticability of imposing upon tenants a duty of inspection-also com-
pel the conclusion that a tenant's lack of knowledge of defects is not a pre-
requisite to the landlord's breach of the warranty. 9
Previously California law held that absent an agreement with a
landlord that the landlord would repair known defects, the tenant
4. Id. at 53-54, 623 P.2d at 272-73, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 711-12. This is directly con-
trary to the holding in Quevedo v. Braga, 72 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 140 Cal. Rptr. 143
(1977), that the defects must be neither known nor readily apparent in order for
there to be a breach. See also Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525
P.2d 88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974); Square Deal Mach. Co. v. Garrett Corp., 128 Cal.
App. 2d 286, 275 P.2d 46 (1954).
5. 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974). In Green, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court noted that neither party to the unlawful detainer action had
alleged that the premises in question were uninhabitable before the tenant had
taken possession of the premises. As a result, the court did not decide whether
the lease was an illegal contract or whether the tenant assumed any risk by rent-
ing property in a defective condition. Id. at 621, n.3, 517 P.2d at 1170-71 n.3, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 706-07 n.3. Therefore, the Green court did not address that part of the Knight
decision dealing with waiver of the warranty by knowledge of defect present
before execution of a lease.
6. Previously, the law in California had been that a reasonable time to repair
must be afforded a landlord before such withholding can take place. See Hinson v.
Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 70, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661, 666 (1972) (the court expressly held
that allowing a landlord a reasonable time to repair was a prerequisite to with-
holding rent).
7. 29 Cal. 3d at 57, 623 P.2d at 274, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
8. Id. at 54, 623 P.2d at 273, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
9. Id.
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could not withhold rent in an unlawful detainer action when he
had actual knowledge of the defects before coming into posses-
sion of the property.O
The court in Knight also held that a residential tenant could
withhold rent for a breach of implied covenant of habitability
even though the landlord may not have been given a reasonable
opportunity to repair." Following Green v. Superior Court,12
Knight held that a breach of implied warranty could be raised as
a defense in an unlawful detainer action.13 However, the Knight
decision is a departure from previous California law.14 This court
expressly held that allowing the landlord a reasonable time to re-
pair was not a necessary precondition to a tenant withholding
rent.15 The Knight court stated that "(o)therwise, the mutual de-
pendence of a landlord's obligation to maintain habitable prem-
ises, and a tenant's duty to pay rent, would make no sense."16
After finding an old California case, Standard Livestock Co. v.
Pentz,17 inapplicable to this-particular situation, the Knight court
established that "a tenant may defend an unlawful detainer ac-
tion against a current owner, at least with respect to rent cur-
rently being claimed due, despite the fact that the uninhabitable
conditions first existed under a former owner."18
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Knight affords tenants protection in these particu-
larized situations. Tenants may be aware of specific defects in
rental property, yet they may withhold rent or defend an unlawful
detainer action.19 Further, tenants are no longer required to af-
ford their landlord a reasonable time to repair before withholding
rent for a breach of implied warranty of habitability. Additionally,
10. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
11. 29 Cal. 3d at 55, 623 P.2d at 273, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
12. 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517, 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974). In this case as a defense
to an unlawful detainer action, Green pointed to 80 housing violations, many of a
serious nature, for which the landlord had been cited. The tenant was successful
in justifying his non-payment of rent on an implied warranty of habitability argu-
ment. For present dwelling standards, see CAL. CMy. CODE § 1941.1 (West Supp.
1981).
13. 29 Cal. 3d at 52, 623 P.2d at 271, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
14. See note 4 supra.
15. 29 Cal. 3d at 55, 623 P.2d at 273, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
16. Id.
17. 204 Cal. 618 (1928). The Knight court distinguished Standard Livestock
Co.. The case dealt with an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment and retroactive
rent reductions prior to the new ownership of the property, while Knight con-
cerned the warranty of habitability and present rent reductions against the pres-
ent landlord.
18. 29 Cal. 3d at 57, 623 P.2d at 275, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
19. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
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new landlords are subject to most breaches of warranty commit-
ted by their predecessor in interest, including the implied war-
ranty of habitability.20
B. LICENSES
1. Business and Professions Code Section 10475: Deas v.
Knapp
Section 10475 of the California Business and Professions Code'
automatically suspends the license of any real estate broker or
salesman if a consumer successfully makes a claim of fraud
against him and a special state fund is used to satisfy this claim.2
The California Supreme Court in Deas v. Knapp3 has now held
20. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
1. Should the commissioner pay for the separate account in the Real Es-
tate Fund for education, research, and recovery purposes any amount in
settlement of a claim or toward satisfaction of a judgment against a li-
censed broker or salesman, the license of the broker or salesman shall be
automatically suspended upon the effective date of an order by the court
as set forth herein authorizing payment from the separate account in the
Real Estate Fund for education, research, and recovery purposes. No such
broker or salesman shall be granted reinstatement until he has repaid in
full, plus interest at the prevailing legal rate * * * applicable to a judg-
ment rendered in any court of this state, the amount paid for the separate
account in the Real Estate Fund for education, research, and recovery
purposes on his account. A discharge in bankruptcy shall not relieve a
person from the penalties and disabilities provided in this article.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10475 (West Supp. 1981).
2. (a) When any aggrieved person obtains obtains a final judgment in
any court of competent jurisdiction against any person or persons licensed
under this part, under grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, deceit, or con-
version of trust funds arising directly out of any transaction when the
judgment debtor was licensed and performed acts for which a license is
required under this part, and which cause of action occurred on or after
July 1, 1964, the aggrieved person may, upon the judgment becoming final,
file a verified application in the court in which the judgment was entered
for an order directing payment out of the separate account in the Real Es-
tate Fund for education, research, and recovery purposes of the amount of
actual and direct loss in such transaction up to the sum of ten thousand
dollars ($10,000) of the amount unpaid upon the judgment, provided that
nothing shall be construed to obligate such separate account for more
than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) per transaction regardless of the
number of persons aggrieved or parcels of real estate involved in such
transaction.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10471 (West Supp. 1981).
3. 29 Cal. 3d 69, 623 P.2d at -, - Cal. Rptr. - (1981). In a suit for fraud
against a real estate broker Knapp, judgment was entered for in excess of $50,000.
Later, the plaintiffs sought to collect at least part of their judgment by filing a
claim against a state fund designed partially for that purpose. At the subsequent
trial, plaintiffs were allowed to prevent relitigation of the fraud issues previously
decided and therefore received the maximum amount of $20,000 from the fund
which was distributed among the various plaintiffs. Justice Newman wrote the
1175
that in a preceeding against this state fund the doctrine of res
judicata4 would not bar relitigation of the fraud issues decided at
the previous trial.5
The court in Deas stated:
Though the licensee has full opportunity to litigate the fraud in the origi-
nal action, the fact that only monetary liability is immediately involved
may fall into not defending it as vigorously as the later fund proceeding
that can result in automatic exclusion from the real estate business.
6
Thus, the court found that only a rebuttable presumption could
be created by a prior judgment, and that "(i)f either the commis-
sioner or the debtor introduced evidence from which fraud may
be found nonexistent, the presumption disappears and plaintiff
has the burden of proving the cause of action."7
The Deas decision affords greater liberty to real estate sales-
man and brokers. Now salesmen and brokers need not diligently
defend original suits for fraud knowing that res judicata will not
prevent them from relitigating the fraud issue at a subsequent
trial where the individual'g license is at stake.
V. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. PROCESS
1. Statutory Service Period Under Civil Procedure Code
section 581(a): Hocharian v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
County
Under California law, a plaintiff must serve a summons on a
complaint and make a return within three years after an action is
filed. The California Supreme court addressed the issue of what
court's opinion, with Justices Tobriner, Clark, and Richardson concurring. Justice
Mosk, joined by Chief Justice Bird, believed that judicial economy dictated that all
issues should have been decided at that time, filed a concurring and dissenting
opinion.
4. The doctrine of res judicata precludes parties or their privies from re-
litigating a cause of action that has been finally determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction. Any issue necessarily decided in such litigation is
conclusively determined as to the parties or their privies if it is involved in
a subsequent lawsuit on a different cause of action.
Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 810, 122 P.2d 892, 894 (1942).
5. The court distinguished § 10177.5 of the Business and Professions Code,
which as interpreted by Richard v. Gordon, 254 Cal. App. 2d 735, 62 Cal. Rptr. 466
(1967), authorizes the use of res judicata, from § 10473.1 which was at issue in
Deas and which does not mention res judicata. The court noted that while in
§ 10473.1, suspension or revocation of a license is discretionary, in Deas and
§ 10177.5, suspension or revocation of the license is mandatory if there is reim-
bursement by the distributed funds. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10475 (West Supp.
1981).
6. 29 Cal. 3d at 79, 623 P.2d at 735, 171 Cal. Rptr. 823.
7. Id. at 79-80, 623 P.2d at -, 171 Cal. Rptr. 827. See generally CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 10473.1 (West Supp. 1981).
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set of criteria governed the operation of the mandatory dismissal
provision section 581a of the California Code of Civil Procedure if
the summons was not served within the required time.1
In Hocharian v. Superior Court of Los Angeles,2 the plaintiff
served a summons on the last of several defendants to a negli-
gence action nine weeks after the expiration of the three-year
service period. The delay in service was allegedly due to the diffi-
culties experienced in learning of the petitioner's involvement in
the case. 3 The court recognized that certain exceptions to section
581a had been established in Wyoming Pacific Oil v. Preston.4
These exceptions include "impossibility, impracticability, and fu-
tility" in attempting to serve the defendant. The plaintiff in
Hocharian claimed that her inability to learn of the petitioner's
involvement until late in the suit caused her failure to comply
with section 581a which therefore justified the enaction of the
"impossibility" exception.5 Chief Justice Bird ordered the trial
court to hold a hearing on the issue of whether or not the plaintiff
used reasonable diligence in presenting the case. Such a hearing
would enable the court to determine if the plaintiff's situation fits
1. Section 581a, subdivision (a) provides:
No action heretofore or hereafter commenced by complaint shall be fur-
ther prosecuted, and no further proceedings shall be had therein, and all
actions heretofore or hereafter commenced shall be dismissed by the
court in which the same shall have been commenced, on its own motion,
or on the motion of any party interested therein, whether named as a
party or not, unless the summons on the complaint is served and return
made within three years after the commencement of said action....
CAL. CODE Civ. PROC § 581a (a) (West 1976).
2. 28 Cal. 3d 714, 621 P.2d 829, 170 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1981).
3. Id. at 718, 621 P.2d at 830, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 791. The plaintiff was unable to
learn the identity of the party who actually had worked on the brakes of the auto-
mobile which had caused the accident.
4. 50 Cal. 2d 736, 329 P.2d 489 (1958). In Wyoming Pacific, the court found
that it was an abuse of the court's discretion to dismiss an action merely because
the defendant had been served only one week after the expiration of the three-
year period provided under § 581a. This holding was a result of the finding of the
trial court that the defendant had been intentionally concealing himself to avoid
service, and that it was only through repeated efforts during the following week
that personal service was finally accomplished. The court concluded that this dis-
cretionary power must be "exercised in accordance with the spirit of the law and
with a view of subserving, rather than defeating, the ends of substantial justice."
Id. at 741, 329 P.2d at 493.
5. The court found that the plaintiff had no way of knowing of the defend-
ant's involvement until a deposition in September of 1979. At that time, the indi-
vidual who was normally charged with the maintainence of the faulty brakes
revealed the name of the temporary mechanic, Hocharian, who had acted negli-
gently. See 28 Cal. 3d at 718, 621 P.2d at 830, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 791.
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within the exceptions of "impossibility, impracticability, or futil-
ity" recognized in Wyoming Pacific.
VI. FAMILY LAW
A. CHILD CUSTODY SEVERENCE
1. Clear and Convincing Proof Required: In re Angelia P.
Recently, there has been much confusion concerning the quan-
tum of proof required in an action for permanent severance of a
child from his or her parents.' In re Angelia P.2 clarifies Califor-
nia's position by adopting the clear and convincing proof stan-
dards for all actions arising under section 232 of the California
Civil Code.3
In In re Angelia P., the California Supreme Court determined
that the standard of clear and convincing proof to determine
whether it would be detrimental to return the child to its parent,
is proper when dealing with severance of parent-child relation-
ships.4 Aligning themselves with many other jurisdictions, 5 the
1. Before a 1976 amendment, § 232 of the California Civil Code required proof
that the return of the child would be detrimental and that this proof must be be-
yond a reasonable doubt where a child had been seperated from its parents for
more than two years. See 1973 Cal. Stats. 1242, current version at CAL. Crv. CODE
§ 232 (West Supp. 1981). Still, cases dealing with other portions of the section held
that a mere preponderance of the evidence would be sufficient. See In re Rose G.,
57 Cal. App. 3d 406, 420, 129 Cal. Rptr. 338, 346-47 (1976) (the court used a prepon-
derance of the evidence standard in a § 232 proceeding); but see In re Cynthia K.,
76 Cal. App. 3d 81, 85-86, 141 Cal. Rptr. 875, 878 (1977) (the court rejected the pre-
ponderance standard); In re Robert P., 61 Cal. App. 3d 310, 319, 132 Cal. Rptr. 5, 10
(1976) (court found that clear and convincing proof would be required in sever-
ance actions). See generally In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 523 P.2d 244, 114 Cal. Rptr.
444 (1974); Alsager v. District Court of Polk City, Iowa, 496 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa
1975). See also Comment, Dependency Proceedings What Standard of Proof. An
Argument Against the Standard of "Clear and Convincing," 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1155 (1977).
2. 28 Cal. 3d 908, 623 P.2d 198, 171 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1981). Angelia, three months
old, suffered severe physical and psychological injuries at the hands of her father,
who was ultimately imprisoned for wilful cruelty. The child, removed to a foster
home, was to return eventuaUy to her mother even though her mother objected at
first to her return. After her father had been released, Angelia's mother requested
that custody be returned to them gradually. The court refused to order the return
of the child and found that Angelia should be free from her parents' custody and
control according to her best interests. Justices Tobriner, Mosk, and Clark con-
curred in an opinion written by Justice Richardson. Chief Justice Bird dissented,
joined by Justice Newman.
3. Section 323 deals with several different situations where severence wil be
permitted. In only one of these designated situations is a standard of proof even
prescribed. CAL. Crv. CODE § 232 (West Supp. 1981).
4. 28 Cal. 3d at 919, 623 P. 2d at 204, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 643.
5. See, e.g., Danford v. Dupree, 272 Ala. 517, 132 So.2d 734 (1961) (clear and
satisfactory); Hill v. Neely, 242 Ark. 686, 415 S.W.2d 558 (1967) (clear and convinc-
ing); Torres v. Van Eepoel, 98 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1957) (clear and convincing); In re
Overton, 211 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 316 N.E.2d 201 (1974) (clear and convincing);
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court rejects the argument that parental rights, fundamental in
nature,6 should require a higher standard, proof beyond a reason-
able doubt.7 The Angelia P. court reasoned that although parent-
ing may be a fundamental right, it is still well established in
California that the "best interests of the child" are of paramount
importance.8 Therefore, the court concluded that the clear and
convincing proof "test is fully consistent with the goal of section
232 to provide 'the fullest opportunity to the parents for exercise
of their rights not inconsistent with the ultimate best interests of
the child.'"9
The court, in adopting the clear and convincing standard over
the reasonable doubt standard, establishes that the child's best
interests must be given significant weight. Therefore, In re Ange-
lia P. facilitates the removal of children from their parents under
certain circumstances,' 0 with lesser deference given to parental
rights.
Henrickson v. Binkley, 161 Ind. App. 388, 316 N.E.2d 376 (1974), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 868 (1975) (clear and cogent); Ransom v. Mitchell, 193 So. 2d 359 (La. App.
1966) (strong and clear); Hollick v. McDaniel, 401 P.2d 466 (Okla. 1965) (clear and
convincing); In re Hernandez, 249 Pa. Super. Ct. 274, 376 A.2d 648 (1977) (convinc-
ing); Calhoun v. Ruffer, 425 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (clear and convincing);
Walker v. Brooks, 203 Va. 417, 124 S.E.2d 195 (1962) (clear, cogent, and convincing);
State ex rel. Kiger v. Hancock, 153 W. Va. 404, 168 S.E.2d 798 (1969) (cogent and
convincing); Farwell v. Farwell, 33 Wis. 2d 324, 147 N.W.2d 289 (1967) (substantial).
6. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). The United States Supreme
Court in Stanley established that a parent has a very strong and undeniable inter-
est in raising his or her children. See generally Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
7. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt generally applies only in criminal cases,
where the possibility of loss of liberty exists. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970). See generally Comment, Does Due Process Require Clear and Convincing
Proof Before Life's Liberties May be Lost?, 24 EMORY L.J. 105 (1975); Note, Proceed-
ings to Terminate Paternal Rights: Too Much or Too Little Protection for Parents?,
16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 337 (1976).
8. See In re Marriage of Carney, 24 Cal. 3d 725, 730, 598 P.2d 36, 38, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 383, 385 (1979); In re Marriage of Mehlmauer, 60 Cal. App. 3d 104, 109, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 325, 328 (1976); In re Reyna, 55 Cal. App. 3d 288, 304, 126 Cal. Rptr. 138, 144
(1976); Cheryl H. v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. App. 3d 273, 278, 115 Cal. Rptr. 849, 852
(1974).
9. 28 Cal. 3d at 919, 623 P.2d at 204, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 643.
10. Among the circumstances enumerated in § 232 are those circumstances
where the child has been deliberately abandoned, where the child has been
abused or neglected, where the parents are alcoholic, drug addicts, or morally de-
praved, where parents are either developmentally disabled or mentally ill, where
the child receives inadequate supervision because of parent's mental deficiency or
illness, and where the child has been in a foster home or other institution for over
two years. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232 (West Supp. 1981).
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B. CHANGE IN CHILD'S SURNAME
1. Best Interests of the Child Standard: In re Marriage of
Schiffman
1. INTRODUCTION
Since the adoption of the Uniform Parentage Act' in 1975, Cali-
fornia courts have steadily redefined areas of family law dealing
with the parent-child relationship. The Uniform Parentage Act
had provided that, wherever possible, both parents were to be ac-
corded the same rights and obligations concerning their relation-
ships with their children. 2 A recent California case, Donald J. v.
Evna M. ,3 applied this Act to the common law rule that the father
will be given preference in determining a child's surname. In dis-
crediting the old common law rule, the court in Donald J. stated:
With the adoption of the California Uniform Parentage Act no longer can
it be said that a parent has a primary right or protective interest in having
his or her child bear and maintain the parent's surname merely because
of the parent's sex and marital status with respect to that child's other
parent at the time the child is born.
4
Taking this one step further, the California Supreme Court in In
re Marriage of Schiffman5 now expressly disaffirms the line of
previously well defined cases 6 which had held that in disputes be-
1. CAL. CrV. CODE §§ 7000-7021 (West Supp. 1981).
2. Id. §§ 7001,7002 (West Supp. 1981).
3. 81 Cal. App. 3d 929, 147 Cal. Rptr. 15 (1978). In Donald J. the father of an
illegitimate child sought to have himself declared the father and have the child's
surname changed to his own from that of the mother's. He was denied relief of
trial, but on appeal was allowed to attempt proof of paternity, thereby possibly re-
ceiving a name modification.
4. Id. at 937, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
5. 28 Cal. 3d 640, 620 P.2d 579, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1980). Patricia C. Herdman
and Jason A. Schiffman separated six months after their marriage on January 15,
1977. Upon petitioning for dissolution on August 4, 1977, Mrs. Schiffman registered
the child as Aita Marie Herdman on her birth certificate. At the trial for dissolu-
tion on February 21, 1978, the court granted dissolution, awarding Mrs. Schiffman
custody of the child. Further, the trial court ordered the child's surname to be
changed to Schiffman and enjoined both parties from changing it. The trial court
wrongly based its decision on "the traditional rule that the father has a 'primary
right' or 'protectable interest' in having the minor child bear his surname even af-
ter the mother is awarded custody." Id. at 642, 620 P.2d at 580, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 919
(citations omitted).
6. In re Trower, 260 Cal. App. 2d 75, 66 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1968), found that in a
suit to change a child's surname from that of the father to that of the mother's sec-
ond husband, the court stated that even though a father's right to have a child
bear his name is not absolute, it is both primary and protectible. In re Worms, 252
Cal. App. 2d 130, 60 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1976), found that where a mother wished to
change her childrens' names from their father's to their step-father's in order to
avoid difficulties at school, the court held such slight inconvenience, in the ab-
sence of the father's misconduct or definite detriment to the child, was insufficient
when compared to the natural rights vested in the father. Montandon v. Montan-
don, 242 Cal. App. 2d 886, 52 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1966), was an action by a divorced father
to have his children bear his surname and not that of the mother's second hus-
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tween parents over a child's surname the father had a "primary
right" and a "protectible interest" in the minor using the father's
surname. The court in Schiffman 7 replaced this old common law
rule with the standard for child custody disputes, i.e., best inter-
ests of the child will prevail.8
II. THE CouRT's DECISION
The court in In re Marriage of Schiffnan felt that "the Legisla-
ture clearly has articulated the policy that irrational, sex based
differences in marital and parental rights should end and that pa-
rental disputes about children should be resolved in accordance
with the child's best interest."9 The court pointed to several re-.
cent developments to support its position. To begin with, the leg-
islature eliminated the maternal preference in child custody
disputes in favor of an absolute "best interests" standard.lO Also,
band, the court determined that the father had a genuine interest in having his
children retain his name. In re Larson, 81 Cal. App. 2d 258, 183 P.2d 688 (1947),
held that where a mother sought to change the name of her child from the father's
to her second husband's, a primary right existed in the father which prevented
such action absent at least some opportunity for the father to establish his right in
having the child's surname remaining the same.
7. Justice Newman wrote the majority opinion for the court with Justices To-
briner and Manuel concurring. In a separate concurring opinion Justice Mosk ex-
pressed his concern about the implementation of the new standard. Justice Mosk
believed that a custodial parent should have the right to either select or change
the name of any child in his or her custody as a part of the panoply of rights to be
associated with custody. Therefore, a rebuttable presumption would exist that the
custodial parent had acted in the child's best interest and the noncustodial parent
would bear the burden of proving otherwise. Chief Justice Bird, in another con-
curring opinion, expressed a different concern. The Chief Justice was "concerned
about the lack of a clear jurisdictional basis for the trial court's modification of a
child's name in the course of a dissolution of marriage." Id. at 651, 620 P.2d at 586,
169 Cal. Rptr. at 925. The Chief Justice would look to the legislature to clarify
whether jurisdiction exists.
8. The idea that the best interests of the child is controlling in child custody
cases emerged early in California law. Wand v. Wand, 14 Cal. 512, 517 (1860).
Since that time, a child's best interest has continued as the paramount considera-
tion in custody disputes. See e.g., In re Marriage of Carney, 24 Cal. 3d 725, 730, 598
P.2d 36, 38, 157 Cal. Rptr. 383, 385 (1979); In re Marriage of Mehlmauer, 60 Cal. App.
3d 104,109,131 Cal. Rptr. 325, 328 (1976); In re Reyna, 55 Cal. App. 3d 288, 304, 126
Cal. Rptr. 138, 144 (1976); Cheryl H. v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. App. 3d 273, 278, 115
Cal. Rptr. 849, 852 (1974).
9. 28 Cal. 3d at 645, 620 P.2d at 582, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 921.
10. CAL. Crv. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1981). The statute states, in pertinent
part:
(a) The Legislature finds and declares that it is the public policy of this
state to assure minor children of frequent and continuing contact with
both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage,
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sex differences affecting marital property rights were virtually
eliminated." Further, the adoption of the Uniform Parentage Act
gave equal rights and obligations to both parents regardless of
their marital status.12
Continuing this line of development, the court in Schiffnan
stated that the common law rule of paternal preference in sur-
name disputes was abrogated by Donald J..13 Still, the court in
Donald J. held that in a situation, where the surname of a child
has been the same for a long period of time, a court "should exer-
cise its power to change the child's surname reluctantly, and only
where the substantial welfare of the child requires the change."' 4
This standard was much less flexible than the one ultimately
adopted by the court in Schiffman.'5
In Schiffman, the majority stated that the length of time a sur-
name is used is only one of many considerations entering into the
determination of the child's best interest.16 Other considerations
include "the effect of a name change on preservation of the fa-
ther-child relationship, the strength of the mother-child relation-
ship, and the identification of the child as part of a family unit."' 7
III. CONCLUSION
The Schiffman decision not only changes the law in California
but it also separates California from other common law jurisdic-
tions.' 8 The law in California no longer evidences a strong prefer-
and to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child
rearing to effect this policy.
(b) Custody should be awarded in the following order of preference ac-
cording to the best interests of the child:
(1) To both parents pursuant to Section 4600.5 or to either parent. In
making an order for custody to either parent, the court shall consider,
among other factors, which parent is more likely to allow the child or chil-
dren frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent, and
shall not prefer a parent as custodian because of that parent's sex.
Id.
11. CAi. Crv. CODE §§ 5100-5138 (West Supp. 1981).
12. CAL. CrV. CODE §§ 7000-7021 (West Supp. 1981).
13. 28 Cal. 3d at 645, 620 P.2d at 582, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 921.
14. 81 Cal. App. 3d at 937, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
15. The Donald J. standard not only requires a change of circumstances, an
important aspect in child custody disputes, but also requires substantial detriment
to the child before a change can be effected.
16. 28 Cal. 3d at 647, 620 P.2d at 583, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 922.
17. Id. See generally Comment, The Controversy over Children's Surnames:
Familial Autonomy, Equal Protection and the Child's Best Interest, 1979 UTAH L.
REV. 303 (1979).
18. Several states still show a strong preference for allowing or ordering chil-
dren to maintain their father's surname. Among these states are Maryland, New
York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Tennessee. See e.g., Hall v. Hall, 30 Md. App.
214, 351 A.2d 917 (1976); In re Cohn, 181 Misc. 1021, 50 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1942); Kay v.
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ence that a child maintain its father's surname in virtually all
situations. 19 Also, the law does not require that the child's sub-
stantial welfare be at stake before a surname can be changed.20
The Schinzan standard, determining the surname from the best
interests of the child, is much more flexible. It will allow parents
to more readily modify their child's surname with a showing that
the change is in the child's best interest.
VII. CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION
A. ARTICLE IV, SECTIONS 12(E) AND 17
1. Adjustment to State Employee's Salary: Jarvis v.
Cory
The court in Jarvis v. Coryl considered the constitutionality of
a lump sum payment to certain state employees, based on work
already performed, due to an alleged miscalculation in percentage
salary increases.
The plaintiff, a taxpayer, sought a writ of mandate against the
defendant, the California State Controller, declaring the salary
appropriation bill unconstitutional and prohibiting the defendant
from expending funds pursuant to the bill. The ground for the
claim was that the bill violated the California constitutional provi-
sions that preclude the legislature from enacting retroactive "ex-
tra compensation" for state employees 2 and from spending money
that effects a future budget act before that act takes effect.3
Responding to the first contention, the court, in an opinion writ-
ten by Justice Mosk, held that state employees salaries were a
Bell, 95 Ohio App. 520, 121 N.E.2d 206 (1953); Reed v. Reed, 338 P.2d 350 (Okla.
1959); Walberg v. Walberg, 22 Or. App. 118, 538 P.2d 96 (1975); Pendraz v. Pendraz,
35 Tenn. App. 284, 245 S.W.2d 204 (1951). See generally Calson, Surname of Mar-
ried Women and Legitimate Children, 17 N.Y.L.F. (1971).
19. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
20. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
1. 28 Cal. 3d 562, 620 P.2d 598, 170 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1980).
2. The California Constitution provides: 'The legislature has no power to
grant ... extra compensation or extra allowance to a public officer, public em-
ployee, or contractor after service has been rendered or a contract has been en-
tered into and performed in whole or in part." CAJ. CONST. art. 4, § 17.
3. Until the budget bill has been enacted, the Legislature shall not send to
the Governor for consideration any bill approapriating funds for expenditure dur-
ing the fiscal year for which the budget bill is to be enacted, except emergency
bills recommended by the Governor or appropriations for the salaries and ex-
penses of the Legislature. CAL. CONST. art. 4, § 12(e).
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matter of "legitimate on-going dispute and uncertainty" and could
therefore be adjusted retroactively without violating the constitu-
tion. The second claim was also dismissed because the funds ap-
propriated by the bill were part of a budget which had been
enacted long before the enactment of the bill. The delay on the
budget taking effect, however, was caused by a veto exercised by
the governor and a subsequent override of that veto by the legis-
lature. The plaintiffs final contention was that the lump-sum pay-
ment of back-salary constituted a gift of public funds serving no
substantial public purpose. This was countered by the finding
that such lump-sum payments do serve a public purpose by en-
suring continued recruitment and retention of qualified employ-
ees and avoid legal disputes over equal protection claim.4
Justice Richardson dissented to the holding by the majority
that the lump-sum payment did not constitute "extra compensa-
tion," prohibited by the California Constitution. The dissent's ar-
gument was that the uncertainty, salary levels were fixed and
readily ascertainable.5
VIII. CRIMINAL LAW
A. COMMON LAw CRIMES
1. Public Policy behind Compounding Crimes: Hoines
v. Barney's Club, Inc.
The Supreme Court of California in Hoines v. Barney's Club,
Inc. 1 established a modern interpretation of the common law
crime known as "compounding crimes." The compounding of
crimes occurs when one frustrates the performance of justice.
In Hoines, the plaintiff was arrested by the defendant's employ-
4. 28 Cal. 3d at 578-79 n.10, 620 P.2d at 608 n.10, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 21 n.10. The
court cites Sonoma County Organization of Pub.. Employees v. County of Sonoma,
23 Cal. 3d 296, 591 P.2d 1, 152 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1979) as a potential basis for an equal
protection claim although the court found it unneccessary to reach the merits of
that claim due to the pay raise within.
The claim that the payment made was invalid as a gift rests under a provision of
the California Constitution prohibiting any gift of public funds that serves no sub-
stantial public purpose. CAL. CONST. art 16, § 6. In county of Alameda v. Carleson,
5 Cal. 3d 730, 488 P.2d 953, 97 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1971), the court found that lump-sum
payments for the continued operation of both recruitment and retention of quali-
fied employees was a reasonable basis for such payment. See also San Joaquin
County Employee's Ass'n., Inc. v. County of San Joaquin, 39 Cal. App. 83, 87-88, 113
Cal. Rptr. 912, 916-917 (1974).
5. 28 Cal. 3d at 582, 620 P.2d at 610, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 23. Justice Richardson
found no basis for the claim that the employee's salaries were uncertain other
than general economic considerations that are normally found. He also found that
there were no ongoing negotiations that would indicate that the salary levels were
not fixed.
1. 28 Cal. 3d 603, 620 P.2d 628, 170 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1980).
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ees for disturbing the peace and was incarcerated in a county jail
for approximately two hours before being released. Claiming in-
adequate grounds for the arrest, the plaintiff brought suit against
the defendants alleging assault, battery, false imprisonment, mali-
cious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
A discussion between the plaintiff and the assistant district attor-
ney occurred during which the assistant district attorney in-
formed the plaintiff that he would be willing to dismiss the charge
against the plaintiff, if the plaintiff would sign a release of all
claims against other parties involved in the arrest. This dismissal,
the plaintiff claims, constitutes a separate crime known as com-
pounding a crime under the common law. Justice Clark, writing
for the majority, explained that the assistant district attorney was
vested with the authority to make judgments regarding whether
or not to file formal charges against a defendant. 2 He then de-
fined the crime as being limited to the situation where one re-
ceives consideration pursuant to an agreement to frustrate the
prosecution of certain criminal conduct.3 The majority distin-
guished the definition from the present situation by noting that
no real compensation was rendered to the public official and that
the dismissal of the criminal charge for the release of civil liabil-
ity did not contravene public policy as expressed in the statute
defining compounding crimes. 4
2. 28 Cal. 3d at 611, 620 P.2d at 633, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 47. The court analogized
the present situation with that in People v. Tenorio, 3 Cal. 3d 89, 473 P.2d 993, 89
Cal. Rptr. 249 (1970). In Fenorio, the court found that the prosecutor is vested
with the discretion to pursue or forego prosecution in any given case based upon
an examination of the circumstances of the particular case before him.
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 153 (West 1981). In Bowyer v. Burgess, 54 Cal. 2d
97, 351 P.2d 793, 4 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1960), the California Supreme Court established
that it is a 'crime for any person having knowledge of the actual commission
thereof to agree to compound or conceal such crime or to abstain from any prose-
cution thereof and an agreement not to prosecute a person for a crime is illegal
and void. See also Comment, Compounding Crimes, 27 HASTINGS LJ. 175 (1975).
4. 28 Cal. 3d at 613-14, 620 P.2d at 634, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 48. The court employs
the case of People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970) for
promoting the rationale behind release-dismissal transactions. Although West in-
volved plea bargaining, the court viewed the principles advanced by West as being
directly applicable to the present situation.
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IX. TORTS
A. DEFENSES
1. Fireman's Rule Extended to Police Officers: Hubbard
v. Boelt
In the case of Hubbard v. Boelt,1 the court was presented with
the question: Does the "fireman's rule" bar recovery by a police
officer who was injured during a high-speed chase of a reckless
traffic offender?2
Although the California Vehicle Code3 makes it a misdemeanor
to willfully disregard an officer's siren and red light and the Cali-
fornia Penal Code4 forbids the use of force to resist arrest, these
statutes were not designed to protect a police officer from injuries
occurring in the line of duty. This policy is known as the "fire-
man's rule"5 which originally provided that negligence in causing
a fire furnishes no basis for liability to professional fireman in-
jured during the fire. The Hubbard case, in an opinion written by
1. 28 Cal. 3d 480, 620 P.2d 156, 169 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1980).
2. Id. at 483, 620 P.2d at 157, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 707. Hubbard was operating
speed detection equipment when the defendant passed by at 50 miles per hour in
a 25 mile per hour speed zone. The plaintiff immediately activated his emergency
lights and siren and began pursuit. The defendant accelerated to avoid arrest and
exceeded speeds of 100 miles per hour. While passing another vehicle on a blind
curve, the defendant collided with a third vehicle and caused debris to be scat-
tered all over the highway. The plaintiff approached the accident sight at a high
speed and left the road when trying to avoid the debris. The plaintiff's suit is
based on the defendant's negligent and wreckless operation of his motor vehicle,
proximately causing the plaintiffs injuries.
3. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 2800.1 (West Supp. 1981). This section provides:
Every person who, while operating a motor vehicle, hears a siren and sees
at least one lighted lamp exhibiting a red light emanating from a vehicle
which is distinctively marked and operated by a member of the California
Highway Patrol or any peace officer of any sheriffs department or police
department wearing a distinctive uniform and who with the intent to
evade the officer, willfully disregards such siren and light, and who flees or
otherwise attempts to elude a pursuing peace officer's motor vehicle, is
guilty of a misdemeanor.
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 148 (West 1970). In pertinent part it states:
Every person who wilfully resists, delays or obstructs any public officer, in
the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his office, when no other
punishment if prescribed, is punishable by a fine not exceeding one thou-
sand dollars, or by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year,
or both such fine and imprisonment.
5. The court outlined the rationale behind the "fireman's rule" as being
based upon (1) the traditional principle that one who has knowingly and
voluntarily confronted a hazard" cannot recover for injuries sustained
thereby, . .. and (2) a public policy to preclude tort recovery by firemen
or policemen who are presumably adequately compensated (in special
salary, retirement, and disability benefits) for undertaking their hazard-
ous work.
28 Cal. 3d at 482, 620 P.2d at 158, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
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Justice Richardson, extended the applicability of the "fireman's
rule" to police officers. The decision was described as being con-
sistent with public policy in light of the related statutory provi-
sions.6
DRAGO C. BARIC
WiiAm C. BOLLARD
6. 28 Cal. 3d at 486, 620 P.2d at 160, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
1187

